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The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; Pub. L. No. 112–25, § 101, 125 Stat. 240) 
resulted from downward pressure on federal spending, as tax revenues decreased faster 
than expenditures and deficits became unsustainable. The BCA’s discretionary spending 
caps mandate that the Department of Defense (DoD) cut $500 billion in outlays between 
fiscal years 2013–2022. These spending caps, temporarily delayed by the American 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATPR; Pub. L. No. 112–240, § 901, 126 Stat. 2313), were 
realized on March 1, 2013, when $37 billion was sequestered from DoD’s current year 
budget. The discretionary spending caps and sequester resulted as a consequence of 
Congress’s inability to stipulate $1.2 trillion in cuts over a 10-year period in accordance 
with the BCA. Challenged by financial retrenchment, the DoD must now make choices 
within the framework of a new fiscal reality and fewer resources. How do DoD’s 
financial retrenchment choices compare to historical choices of other government, quasi-
government, and publicly traded organizations encountering similar fiscal stress? This 
project creates a framework through examination of comparable government, quasi-
government, and publicly traded organizations to conduct a comparative analysis of the 
DoD’s financial retrenchment choices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROJECT BACKGROUND 
Over 2,981 people were killed during the terrorist attacks perpetrated on 
September 11, 2001 (9/11 Commission, 2004). Since then, American armed forces have 
been engaged globally, combatting terrorist organizations. The cost of this war against 
terrorism has been significant. The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) total budget more 
than doubled from $316 billion in 2001 to a high of $691 billion in 2010 (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) [OUSD(C)], 2013a). This sharp increase in 
discretionary spending, coupled with the nation-wide economic recession of 2008, placed 
downward pressures on the federal budget as expenditures exceedingly surpassed 
revenues and deficits became unsustainable.  
The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; Pub. L. No. 112–25, § 101, 125 Stat. 240) 
resulted from this downward pressure on federal spending. The BCA’s discretionary 
spending caps mandate that DoD cut $500 billion in outlays between fiscal years (FY) 
2013–2022. These spending caps, temporarily delayed by the American Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 2012 (ATPR; Pub. L. No. 112–240, § 901, 126 Stat. 2313), were ultimately 
realized on March 1, 2013, when $37 billion was sequestered from DoD’s current year 
budget. 
The DoD immediately retrenched by cancelling deployments and furloughing 
hundreds of thousands of civilian employees in order to meet short-term financial 
requirements imposed by sequestration. The BCA continues to authorize across-the-board 
sequesters to meet legislatively imposed discretionary caps until 2022. Thus, DoD is 
confronted with the prospect of long-term financial retrenchment.  
On July 22, 2013, Secretary of Defense Charles (Chuck) Hagel signaled that 
financial retrenchment was the new fiscal norm and long-term retrenchment choices must 
be devised and implemented. Secretary Hagel announced that the Pentagon “must 
fundamentally reshape itself to adapt for a future of strategic and budgetary challenges” 
(DoD, 2013c, p. 1). He went on to note that while budget cuts have very damaging effects 
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on the military, DoD must prepare for the future and set clear, strategic priorities within 
the framework of a new fiscal reality and fewer resources (DoD, 2013c). Hagel noted, 
“These cuts are forcing us to make tough but necessary decisions to prioritize missions 
and capabilities around our core responsibility, which is the security of our country” 
(DoD, 2013c, p. 1). How, then, do these financial retrenchment choices compare to other 
organizations under similar fiscal stress? 
B. PROJECT OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this project is to compare DoD’s financial retrenchment choices 
to historical choices of comparable government, quasi-government, and publicly traded 
organizations under similar fiscal stress. Based on these comparisons, we seek to discover 
similarities and differences, among the three sectors, that suggest if DoD’s financial 
choices during times of retrenchment are characteristic of an organization managing 
similar fiscal stress. 
The financial choices of government, quasi-government and publicly traded 
organizations are all affected, to some degree, by their financial condition. The types and 
magnitude of these choices is partially explained by the amount of slack resources 
available to an organization. These slack resources, the difference between revenue and 
expenditures, relates to some level of fiscal stress within the organization. Unknown is if 
government, quasi-government and publicly traded sectors make different financial 
choices when managing similar fiscal stress and DoD’s choices compare. 
Government, quasi-government and publicly traded organizations are selected for 
the purpose of examining multiple sectors to find if DoD’s financial retrenchment choices 
resemble those of a specific sector or are affected by the type of fiscal stress in general. 
The former suggests our findings reveal DoD’s financial retrenchment choices are liken 
to a specific sector. The latter finding would suggest financial retrenchment choices, 
common to all sectors, may be associated to the type of fiscal stress upon the 
organization. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
We seek to determine whether DoD’s financial retrenchment choices, during 
times of financial retrenchment, are characteristic of other organizations managing 
similar fiscal stress. The similarities and differences among financial retrenchment 
choices of comparative organizations will ascertain whether DoD’s choices reflect those 
of a particular sector, are unique to the DoD, or result from the type and cause of fiscal 
stress upon the organization. This project addressed various types and causes of fiscal 
stress along with the strategies and tactics used to manage them in order to identify 
comparative organizations, and their financial retrenchment choices.  
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this project is limited to the financial retrenchment choices of 
government, quasi-government and publicly traded organizations, based in the United 
States, that exhibit multi-year acute fiscal stress caused by external factors. 
This project examines three government organizations, two quasi-government 
organizations, two publicly traded organizations, and the DoD. The seven resulting 
comparisons to the DoD, include three different sectors and represent a variety of markets 
and industries. This is intended to identify intra and cross-sector commonalities and 
differences among financial retrenchment choices. The selection of seven comparative 
organizations and DoD was due to time and available resources. 
This project’s scope is strictly limited to a comparison of financial retrenchment 
choices for the purpose of analyzing DoD’s retrenchment choices are characteristic of 
other organizations. It does not evaluate the effectiveness or efficiency at which any 
organization or financial retrenchment choice alleviates the effects of fiscal stress. 
The scope of this project is also limited by the researcher’s data collection and 
examination. The financial retrenchment decisions of any organization, throughout a 
prolonged period of fiscal stress, are numerous and diverse. There is a natural shortfall in 
our ability to identify an exhaustive record of every significant financial retrenchment 
choice. Specifically, our examination of state governments in specific years, preclude 
other financial retrenchment choices made in subsequent years. 
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E. METHODOLOGY 
This project is based on a literature review that builds a foundation for 
understanding fiscal stress. In the literature review, we examine theoretical as well as 
historic literature relevant to understanding fiscal stress, the causes of financial 
retrenchment, its effects, factors influencing organizational strategy and tactics, and the 
challenges ultimately stemming from financial retrenchment. This is applied to an 
analysis of government, quasi-government, and publicly traded organizations so that 
comparative organizations and their financial choices can be identified. Next, an 
examination of the financial retrenchment choices exhibited by DoD and comparative 
organizations is performed and their choices likened to retrenchment strategies and 
tactics drawn from the literature. These choices, categorized by the strategy and tactic 
they support, are presented within a three sector analytical framework. Finally, we 
present conclusions and offer recommendations. 
F. STRUCTURE OF THE PROJECT 
Following this introduction, a literature review is presented in Chapter II. The 
literature review captures theoretical as well as historic literature relevant to 
understanding fiscal stress, the causes of financial retrenchment, its effects, factors 
influencing organizational strategy and tactics, and the challenges ultimately stemming 
from financial retrenchment. The contributions of various textbooks, academic literature, 
policy statements, articles, journals, and web-based archival databases are synthesized to 
provide a foundation of understanding as well as solidify the relevance and timeliness of 
this project. 
Chapter III presents the information gained from an examination of comparative 
government, quasi-government, and publicly traded organizations. This chapter 
comprises a discussion of the characteristics sought in a comparative organization. 
Subsequently, the organizations are presented along with a discussion of their similarities 
and differences to the stated characteristics. The chapter closes with acknowledgements 
of our research limitations.  
 5 
Chapter IV presents an examination of the financial retrenchment choices made 
by comparative organizations. The financial retrenchment choices are discussed and 
associated with a common retrenchment tactic. Next, a three-sector analytical framework 
is developed and discussed. The common retrenchment tactics of the comparative 
organizations are then added to the framework and the results presented.  
Chapter V presents an examination of DoD’s financial retrenchment choices. The 
type and cause of DoD’s fiscal stress are discussed to liken them to the comparative 
characteristics. Then we review the DoD’s financial retrenchment choices and associate 
these choices with their common retrenchment tactics. DoD’s retrenchment tactics are 
added to the three-sector analytical framework and a comparative analysis is performed. 
The similarities, differences, and distinctiveness amongst choices are evaluated. 
Chapter VI concludes with a presentation of conclusions and recommendations 
based on information collected and analyzed in Chapters I–V. We also provide 
recommendations for further research in Chapter VI. 
 6 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents background information from established literature that 
provides a foundation for understanding DoD’s fiscal condition. First, we evaluate the 
topic of fiscal stress, distinguishing the different types and how they affect organizations. 
Second, we analyze the subject of financial retrenchment to include its causes and effects. 
Finally, we review strategies and tactics used to manage fiscal stress followed by their 
aftereffects. 
B. UNDERSTANDING FISCAL STRESS UPON AN ORGANIZATION 
Understanding the type of fiscal stress upon an organization is fundamental to our 
endeavor. It is necessary to classify the fiscal stress associated with DoD’s current 
financial position and to identify comparable government, quasi-government, and 
publicly traded organizations. By classifying the types of fiscal stress, we can identify the 
type of stress currently exhibited by DoD’s, and find comparative organizations. 
Furthermore, DoD’s financial retrenchment choices, and those of the comparative 
organizations, can be associated with a certain type of fiscal stress. This forms the 
informational base for comparative analysis. 
Defining fiscal stress is a natural starting point. McCaffery and Jones (2001) 
briefly defined fiscal stress as a state in which difficulty is experienced in balancing 
revenues and expenditures over a long period of time. This is a rather simple definition. 
No government or organization has infinite resources and all have some form of internal 
politics or disagreement. Therefore, some level of difficulty in balancing limited revenues 
with organizational demands for expenditure always exists. 
Allen Schick (1980) addressed the constant disparity between limited revenue and 
desired expenditure by looking at fiscal stress through the concept of scarcity. Schick 
(1980) highlighted that scarcity is a matter of both attitude and circumstance. Whereas a 
surplus may reflect availability of an ample budget margin or the restraint of a balanced 
budget mandate, a deficit may reflect a desperate shortage of funds to meet established 
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commitments or an organization’s willingness to expand available resources for the 
purpose of creating economic growth. The attitude and circumstance of the organization 
allow it to perceive fiscal stress differently. Schick’s (1980) definition, by his own 
admission, highlighted the difficulty in defining fiscal stress because it can be either real 
or perceived. 
Schick (1980) noted that scarcity can be self-imposed but exists as a matter of 
circumstance for most governments, offered four categories of scarcity: relaxed scarcity, 
chronic scarcity, acute scarcity, and total scarcity.  
1. Relaxed Scarcity 
Relaxed scarcity infers a government has sufficient resources to continue existing 
programs and to undertake substantial new budget commitments. Budgeting under 
relaxed scarcity reflects (1) a reorientation of budgeting from control (and/or 
management) functions to planning; (2) little review or evaluation of existing programs, 
which are permitted to continue and grow in incremental fashion; (3) a drawing together 
of planning and budgeting processes under the aegis of top policy officials; and 
(4) increased attention to program analysis and multiyear budgeting (Schick, 1980). 
2. Chronic Scarcity 
Chronic scarcity reflects a government with enough funds to continue what is 
already being done, but not enough to cover all demands on public resources. Budgeting 
under chronic scarcity reflects the following: (1) The budget will not be used primarily to 
control spending, but emphasis will be placed on management improvements to reduce 
expenditures, increase funds available for new programs, and convey a sense of doing 
something about the budget situation. (2) Program analysis and evaluation are neglected. 
Evaluation (of established programs) has low priority because sufficient funds are 
available for continuation; analysis (of new programs) is unwelcome because funds are 
not available for substantial expansion. (3) Program development is sporadic and 
unsystematic. The preferred strategy is to approve a few programs that have low initial 
costs. (4) The multiyear implications of current policies are not emphasized, except when 
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political leaders want to dampen budget demands. (5) Planning is isolated from budgeting 
and policy making (Schick, 1980). 
3. Acute Scarcity 
Acute scarcity states that available resources are insufficient to cover the 
incremental rise in program costs. Budgeting under acute scarcity reflects (1) use of the 
budget to limit spending by means of both aggregate and itemized controls; (2) 
retrenchment directed against the most vulnerable portions of the budget—discretionary 
programs, administrative and overhead costs, and maintenance activities; (3) not much 
budget-related planning, both because of the fixation on short-term gapsmanship and the 
sense that the government cannot determine its own fate; (4) a modest increase in 
evaluative activates; and (5) renewed emphasis on management efficiencies (Schick, 
1980). 
4. Total Scarcity 
Finally, total scarcity reflects when available resources are not adequate to cover 
ongoing government programs. Schick (1980) stated that total scarcity exists when a 
government is very poor or the demands for services are exceedingly high. It is futile for 
a government afflicted by total scarcity to try to balance supply and demand via the 
budget process. Resources cannot (or will not) be enlarged to meet demands, and the 
demands cannot be trimmed to suit the resources. Therefore, the budget situation is 
typically so precarious that it cannot be resolved by realistic means and escapist 
budgeting becomes rampant (Schick, 1980). 
Fiscal stress, then, understandably involves pressure balancing revenue with 
demand for expenditures. Whether that pressure is real or perceived depends upon the 
organization’s circumstance and attitude. The organization’s actual financial condition, or 
circumstance, proves most useful in ascertaining real fiscal stress. Attitude is linked to 
perceived fiscal stress, and bears no application to identifying real fiscal stress within the 
organizations fiscal environment. Real fiscal stress is linked to four categories of scarcity 
that classify fiscal stress and probable behaviors: relaxed scarcity, implying sufficient 
resources to support growth; chronic scarcity, implying limited growth; acute scarcity, 
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implying an inability to support incremental growth; and total scarcity, implying an 
inability to provide baseline requirements. Which scarcity category reflects the DoD’s 
current financial environment?  
To measure the extent of real fiscal stress upon DoD and comparative 
organizations, so that it may be associated to a scarcity category, it is necessary to 
understand the various ways in which a budget cut can be interpreted. Large and complex 
budgets, such as DoD’s, can be interpreted multiple ways. Whether DoD’s budget is 
rising or falling is more a matter of definition, not fact (Rose, 1980). Defining a budget 
cut, then, begins with determining the baseline by which to establish a definition of the 
cut.  
Once determined, the budget itself can be presented in terms of constant dollars, 
current dollars, percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), or percentage of resources 
contrasted to competing claimants and historical shares of mandatory and discretionary 
spending. These four presentations can portray different narratives about the same budget 
thereby allowing a presenter’s motivation to influence the definition of a cut. 
For our purposes, we focus on budget authority defined by constant and current 
dollars. This enables us to focus on the variation of actual budget authority in our effort 
to determine the extent of real fiscal stress upon the organization. Other means of 
defining the DoD’s budget, such as percentage of GDP, contrasting against competing 
claimants or historical shares of mandatory and discretionary spending, remain valuable 
means of measuring budget trends within the federal government and often indicate 
political preferences. However, constant and current dollars are the manner in which we 
measure the DoD’s actual budget authority because this highlights actual changes in 
budget authority, whereas comparative measurements contrast budget authority against 
something other than actual dollars received. 
Richard Rose (1980) outlined four different ways public expenditure could 
change when measured in terms of both current and constant dollars. As depicted in 
Figure 1, they are (1) actual increases, (2) cuts without qualification, (3) spending 
squeeze, and (4) deflationary windfall. An actual increase occurs when constant and 
 11 
current spending increase. Cuts without qualification occur when constant and current 
spending decrease. Spending squeezes occur when spending increases in current value 
but decreases in terms of constant value. This is a popular political option during periods 
of fiscal stringency because budgets are increased but less than the amount required to 
keep pace with inflation. Finally, deflationary windfalls occur when constant dollars 
decrease, but current dollars increase. Deflationary windfalls are mostly theoretical and 
would occur if deflation reduced prices but the DoD’s budget authority in current terms 
decreased less than the overall fall in price levels (Rose, 1980).  
 
Figure 1.  Current and Constant Expenditure Values (from Rose, 1980) 
An examination of historical and projected budget authority in terms of current 
and constant dollars enables us to classify DoD’s fiscal condition into a scarcity category 
and select comparative organizations. 
C. CAUSES OF FINANCIAL RETRENCHMENT 
Financial retrenchment is the act of reducing spending, beneath established 
baselines, in response to economic difficulty. This section describes the causes of 
financial retrenchment. Defining and categorizing the causes of financial retrenchment 
facilitates identifying the cause of DoD’s fiscal stress. Understanding the cause of fiscal 
stress also contributes to identifying comparative organizations that exhibit similar fiscal 
stress.  
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Governments experience decline by erosion or plan, as they, and the services they 
provide, are constrained by the necessity of choosing how to use scarce resources (Peters 
& Rose, 1980). Societal or financial changes create “the necessity for governments to 
terminate some programs, lower the activity level of others, and confront tradeoffs 
between new demands and old programs rather than to expand whenever a new public 
problem arises” (Levine, 1980b, p. 14). Scarce resources are usually the underlying factor 
that necessitates an organizational change and also impacts how change is managed 
(Levine, 1980b). Levine (1980b) asserted that these changes occur primarily in response 
to internal or external conditions resulting from political, economic, and/or technical 
factors.  
Levine (1980b) categorized four types, as depicted in Figure 2, they are: problem 
depletion, environmental entropy, political vulnerability, and organizational atrophy.  
 
Figure 2.  Causes of Public Organizational Decline (from Levine, 1980b) 
1. Problem Depletion 
Levine (1980b) defined problem depletion as an external political factor that 
occurs when the government’s involvement in a short-term crises, such as a natural 
disaster or humanitarian assistance response, or medium-length engagements, such as war 
mobilization or long-term projects, have ended and are no longer required. Government 
involvement occurs in cycles that begin with “a political definition of a problem followed 
by the extensive commitment of resources to attain critical masses and then contractions 
after the problem has been solved, alleviated, or has evolved into a less troublesome stage 
or politically popular issue” (Levine, 1980b, p. 17).  
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Problem depletion usually results from factors such as demographic shifts, 
problem redefinition, and policy termination that are outside the government’s control.  
a. Demographic Shifts 
A demographic shift occurs when there is a statistical change in the 
characteristics of a population. Levine (1980b) used school closings as an example of a 
demographic shift that occurs because of the aging population of an adjacent 
neighborhood. The aging population is an uncontrollable external factor and the decision 
to close a school is politically determined.  
b. Problem Redefinition 
Problem redefinition occurs when conditions, objectives, or scope of an 
original problem or policy are changed in some manner. To illustrate problem 
redefinition, Levine (1980b) demonstrated how bureaucracy downsizing and the rising 
patient costs of hospitalization, combined with pharmaceutical advances in 
antidepressants and tranquilizers, have caused public attitudes and professional doctrine 
to shift regarding the treatment and institutionalization of mentally ill patients.  
c. Policy Termination 
Policy termination is “the final phase of a public policy intervention cycle 
and can be defined as the deliberate conclusion or cessation of specific government 
functions, programs, policies, or organizations” (Levine, 1980b, p. 18).  
2. Environmental Entropy 
Environmental entropy is categorized as an external economic and/or technical 
factor. “Environmental entropy occurs when the capacity of the environment to support 
the public organization at prevailing levels of activity erodes” (Levine, 1980b, p. 18). 
This is often driven by taxpayers’ preferences and their willingness to pay for particular 
activities.  
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3. Political Vulnerability 
Internal factors such as an organization’s size, age, internal conflict, and 
leadership changes can affect its desire and ability to resist budget cuts. Typically, older 
organizations tend to be more established, flexible, and resistant to political vulnerability. 
According to Levine (1980b), “older organizations ought to have a broader range of 
adaptive skills, more capacity for learning, more friends and allies, and be more 
innovative because they have less to fear from making a wrong decision than a younger 
organization” (p. 19).  
4. Organizational Atrophy 
Organizational atrophy is an internal economic and/or technical factor. Atrophy 
and declining performance are often attributable to a host of system and management 
failures such as “inconsistent and perverse incentives, differentiation without 
integrations, role confusion, decentralized authority with vague responsibility, too many 
inappropriate rules, weak oversight, stifled dissent and upward communication” (Levine, 
1980b, p. 19). The is not a comprehensive list, and afflicted organizations may 
experience a combination of similar failures in parallel or at varying times. 
Differentiating among the four decline situations facilitates in identifying the 
cause of DoD’s fiscal stress. It is also an important characteristic that enables 
identification of comparative organizations which exhibit fiscal stress produced by 
similar causes.  
D. EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL RETRENCHMENT  
It is a difficult undertaking for a government, either by choice or circumstance, to 
signal retrenchment internally across the organization as well as externally to its 
stakeholders. Public expenditure is naturally geared toward growth. In periods of relaxed 
scarcity, bottom-up budgeting with little executive guidance can characterize government 
budgeting. This way the government has time to evaluate the economic outlook, revenue 
projections, and the claims submitted by government agencies before determining where 
and what to cut from the budget (Schick, 1986). 
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The opposite is true during time of contraction or stabilization.  
An unconstrained, bottom-up process can ignite a clash between agency 
spending expectations and the government’s determination to restrain 
expenditure. If they are not blocked in advance, powerful spending claims 
can impel the government to spend (and tax or borrow) more than it 
prefers. Even if it rebuffs expansionary demands, by the time the 
government makes budget decisions, it might be too late in the budget 
cycle to achieve significant reductions in existing programs. (Schick, 
1986, p. 83) 
Therefore, in times of financial retrenchment a critical effect is the government’s 
need to signal a change to the fiscal norm. A government must effectively signal that the 
current fiscal environment is unsustainable to set an expectation among agencies and its 
populace that expenditure spending will decrease. Choosing when and how to issue a new 
signal is the first topic we cover in this section. The second topic we address is how the 
government can utilize retrenchment tools, such as ceilings and targets, to achieve the 
objectives required by the fiscal environment. The final topic we examine is the manner 
and importance of altering the balance of power between fiscal conservators and 
claimants during times of retrenchment. 
Collectively, these effects support an examination of DoD’s fiscal condition and 
assist in ascertaining a scarcity category. These effects are evident within the federal 
government today and reinforce that the federal government and DoD are confronting 
prolonged fiscal stress. 
1. Signaling Fiscal Norm Changes 
To contract government expenditure and to counter expansionary pressures, 
governments must signal fiscal norm changes before the start of budget preparations. 
These norms serve more as budget influencers than as strict budget objectives and are 
generally limited to key fiscal aggregates such as total revenues and expenditures and the 
balance between the two (Schick, 1986). Allen Schick (1986) provided an appropriate 
definition for the use and purpose of resetting fiscal norms during time of retrenchment to 
norms of decreased expenditure spending:  
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The norms tend to be political statements concerning the future orientation 
of government policy, and they are especially important when the 
government is altering the direction in which it is headed. The statement 
gives notice to spending agencies, interest groups, and the public at large 
that the budget is being reoriented from expansion to contraction. The 
purpose of the macro norms is to exert downward pressure on spending 
demands, so that both future spending and deficits will be significantly 
below the levels that would ensue if past trends were permitted to 
continue. (p. 83) 
2. Establishing Budget Ceilings and Targets 
Announcing a need or desire to change the fiscal norm from growth to 
retrenchment is ineffectual unless the government can also provide guidance in the form 
of budget ceilings and targets to curb spending. This guidance must be vague in that it 
does not tie the government to a declared objective, but clear enough that agencies reduce 
future spending. These signals tend to be less productive in the short term and more 
productive in the long term as it is not uncommon for governments to discover, when 
they finally consider budget requests, that past commitments exceed the spending total 
contemplated by the norm (Schick, 1986, p. 83). Thus, the new fiscal norm signal may 
not yield remarkable short-term cuts despite the use of ceilings and targets.  
However, the use of ceilings and targets is necessary to slow expenditure growth 
and reinforce the fiscal signal that spending will be reduced. “The ceilings and targets put 
claimants on notice that big increases are a thing of the past and that retrenchment is 
legitimate and necessary” (Schick, 1986, p. 83). 
Many governments have incorporated expenditure ceilings and targets in their 
budget process because fiscal stress has become cyclical within industrialized countries. 
In the United States, a target within the first budget resolution is converted into a ceiling 
and manners by which these can be enforced are provided (Schick, 1986). 
3. Power Shift between Claimants and Conservators 
A power shift between claimants and conservators must occur to successfully 
inhibit agency spending demands. Sending a strong signal that the fiscal norm must 
change is an effective tactic governments use to achieve this end. This tactic involves 
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restating budget issues in financial terms rather than program requirements. Conservators 
are strengthened when the government and populace begin to view changing a negative 
financial environment as more significant than specific program needs (Schick, 1986). 
Once the political discussion is changed from one of program needs to one of 
altering a negative financial environment, ceilings can effectively be used to limit the 
amount for which an agency can ask. Use of a ceiling becomes an effective tool because 
it does not dictate what programs or cuts are to be made, only the amount to be requested 
(Schick, 1986). As a result, “budgetary debate revolves around spending and deficit 
levels, not around the activities to be retrenched by government” (Schick, 1986, p. 83). 
When the political focus is on fixing the fiscal condition of the budget, targets 
also strengthen a conservator’s power. Targets “establish a presumption against 
expenditure in excess of the fixed level. If claimants seed more than the targeted 
amounts, claimants are open to the charge that they are behaving in a fiscally 
irresponsible manner” (Schick, 1986, p. 83). The targets also indicate the new level a 
program will be funded at, and the level to which expenditure growth will be adjusted, 
while leaving the claimants the onus of cutting their own programs (Schick, 1986). 
4. Seeking Program Performance Over Potential 
It is common, during times of financial retrenchment, for governments to invest in 
programs based on performance versus potential. “Performance—not potential—is the 
more relevant measure when the government seeks to curtail deficits or expenditures as a 
share in Gross National Product” (Schick, 1986, p. 83). Governments prefer to allocate 
scarce resources in performance proven programs because a lack of overall resources 




E. MANAGING FINANCIAL RETRENCHMENT: STRATEGIES AND 
TACTICS 
Throughout history industrialized governments have managed through difficult 
financial environments including periods of retrenchment. What, then, have been the 
traditional strategies and tactics used to confront the financial requirements of 
retrenchment? 
Levine (1980b) distinguished an organization’s retrenchment strategies as resist 
or smooth. A resist strategy infers tactics that aim to externalize the effects of fiscal stress 
from the organization. Conversely, a smoothing strategy infers an organization 
internalizes, at least some part of, the fiscal stress and implements tactics designed to deal 
with the effects. Table 1 summarizes the tactics associated with resist and smooth 
strategies and categorizes them by the cause of fiscal stress.  
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Tactics to Resist Decline Tactics to Smooth Decline
(Problem Depletion)
1. Diversify programs, clients and constituents 1. Make peace with competing agencies
2. Improve legislative liaison 2. Cut low prestige programs
3. Educate the public about the agency's mission 3. Cut programs to politically weak clients
4. Mobilize dependent clients 4. Sell and lend expertise to other agencies
5. Become "captured" by a powerful interest 
group or legislator
5. Share problems with other agencies
6. Threaten to cut vital or popular programs
7. Cut a visible and widespread service a little 
to demonstrate client dependence
(Environmental Entropy)
1. Find a wider and richer revenue base (e.g., 
metropolitian reorganization)
1. Improve targeting on problems
2. Develop incentives to prevent disinvestment 2. Plan with preservative objectives
3. Seek foundation support 3. Cut losses by distinguishing between 
capital investments and sunk costs
4. Lure new public and private sector 
investment
4. Yield concessions to taxpayers and 
employers to retain them
5. Adopt user charges for services where 
possible
(Political Vulnerability)
1. Issue symbolic responses like forming sutdy 
commissions and task forces
1. Change leadership at each stage in the 
decline process
2. "Circle the wagons," i.e., develop a siege 
mentality to retain esprit de corps
2. Reorganize at each stage
3. Strengthen expertise 3. Cut programs run by weak subunits
4. Shift programs to another agency
5. Get temporary exemptions from 
personnel and budgetary regulations which 
limit discretion
(Organizational Atrophy)
1. Increase hierarchical control 1. Renegotiate long term contracts to 
regain flexibility
2. Improve productivity 2. Install rational choice techniques like 
zero based budgeting and evaluation 
research
3. Experiment with less costly service delivery 
systems
3. Mortgage the future by deferring 
maintenance and downscaling personnel 
quality
4. Automate 4. Ask employees to make voluntary 
sacrifices like taking early retirements and 
deferring raises
5. Stockpile and ration resources 5. Improve forecasting capacity to other 
users
6. Reassign surplus facilities to other users
7. Sell surplus property, lease back when 
needed











Table 1.   Tactics to Resist or Smooth Decline (from Levine, 1980b) 
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Levine’s work on cutback management, his classification of strategies, and his 
identification of tactics offers a suitable starting point. However, organizational responses 
to fiscal stress often prove more dynamic than the binomial choices offered by Levine. 
Organizations strategically choosing to resist may recognize the inevitability of 
internalizing some amount of the resulting effects at a later time. Thus, the tactics an 
organization chooses over a time period may comprise a range of alternative strategies 
designed to provide a methodical response. This methodical response may include tactics 
that internalize some effects of fiscal stress, but stop short of completely internalizing all 
of the effects.  
Brook identified four strategies for managing the effects of fiscal stress. 
Organizations may offer strategic responses that resist, delay, minimize, or manage 
budget cuts and their resulting effects (Brook, 2013).  
1. Resist and Delay Strategies 
Resist and delay strategies attempt to externalize, for varying lengths of time, the 
effects of fiscal stress. Whereas resisting endeavors to avoid retrenchment, delaying seeks 
to buy more time to prepare the organization for forthcoming cuts.  
When resisting financial retrenchment, agencies often select tactics designed to 
highlight the importance of their mission in order to protect their people, performance, 
and budget from cuts. These tactics involve contrasting historical budget funding to other 
agencies or GDP, highlighting multi-year commitments requiring full funding, 
identifying a critical externality that demands funding, or lobbying the population at large 
to place pressure on political decision-makers. In the U.S. government, these tactics are 
common, not only during times of financial retrenchment, but even during times of 
financial growth as agencies lobby Congress for their “fair share” of appropriations. 
Delaying the effects of financial retrenchment is a commonly used strategy when 
an agency believes fiscal austerity will be short-term, other resources are or will become 
available, or time will help build budget flexibility. Tactics involve budget manipulation 
or alternative sources of funding. Budget manipulation may involve optimistic economic 
scenarios, property sales or privatization of minor assets or services, inter-budget 
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borrowing, the timing of expenditures to occur in different reporting periods, the deferral 
of financial decisions, the shift of responsibilities to other organizations, or the finding of 
efficiencies or savings to make up the differences (Brook, 2013). Alternatively, 
governments with the ability to raise revenue may borrow, tax, or seek intergovernmental 
assistance from state or federal governments in order to balance budget shortfalls. 
2. Minimize and Manage Strategies 
Minimize and manage strategies suggest internalizing, to varying degrees, the 
effects of fiscal stress. A minimize strategy typically produces retrenchment tactics that 
have a lesser impact to an organization’s infrastructure and its long-term operational 
effectiveness, and produce immediate short-term savings. Management strategies have 
the greatest impact on an organization’s people, performance, and budget. Tactics 
typically produce the greatest expenditure reductions, are slower in producing reductions, 
and have longer-lasting effects upon organizational effectiveness.  
When financial retrenchment is unavoidable, whether it is expected to be short 
term or long term, agencies often choose first to minimize its effects. Tactics associated 
with minimizing strategies characteristically have a lesser impact on organizational 
infrastructure, and are quicker at providing immediate savings with lower impact to an 
organization’s long-term operational effectiveness. If the effects of financial 
retrenchment are expected to be long-term, minimization tactics are commonly employed 
first, thereby enabling administrators time to consider long-term strategy and tactics. 
Minimization techniques also satisfy short-term budget cut requirements and can provide 
budget flexibility within an environment of financial retrenchment. Minimize tactics 
include hiring freezes, furloughs, crisis-to-crisis management, cutting or consolidating 
non-essential programs, small scale productivity and efficiency improvements, burden 
sharing with other agencies, deferring maintenance and capital investments, centralizing 
decision-making, allocating resources based on performance metrics, and renegotiating 
high-cost or long-term contracts (Wolman & Davis, 1980, pp. 232–233). 
Finally, when financial retrenchment is long-term or exceptionally profound, an 
agency must choose to manage its effects and decide what tactics maintain the highest 
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levels of effectiveness within the limits of decreased funding. These tactics 
characteristically have the greatest impact on people, performance, and budget. While the 
tactics produce the greatest expenditure reductions, these tactics are slower in producing 
them, and have longer lasting effects on organizational effectiveness. Tactics include 
organizational restructuring, long-term transformation, low-cost labor alternatives or 
privatization, large-scale productivity and efficiency improvements, selling or leasing 
back surplus property, reducing personnel or capital equipment, early retirement options, 
and reducing or restructuring employee benefits. 
Levine’s classification of resist and smooth strategies offered a theoretical starting 
point to our analysis. Brook, finding more dynamic organizational responses to financial 
retrenchment, proposed resist, delay, minimize, and manage strategies. 
These strategies, and the tactics used to support them, form the basis of our three-
sector analytical framework. Financial choices, identified in Chapter IV’s data 
examination, are presented within a three-sector framework associated with the strategy 
and tactic to which it corresponds. 
The financial retrenchment confronting the DoD, as outlined in the BCA of 2011, 
demands it internalize and administer the forthcoming budget cuts. Therefore, this 
project, and the three-sector matrix, focuses on financial choices designed to strategically 
minimize and manage the effects of financial retrenchment.  
F. FACTORS INFLUENCING RETRENCHMENT STRATEGY AND 
TACTICS 
This section will discuss factors influencing retrenchment strategy and tactics. 
Strategic choices are influenced by the financial environment, political environment, and 
organizational influences (Brook, 2013). Influences upon the DoD and comparative 
organizations are different, at least to some degree, because these organizations operate in 
distinct sectors. Thus, their retrenchment choices may differ as a result of these 
influential factors. Understanding these factors, and their sources, is important to support 
the development of conclusions and recommendations in Chapter VI. 
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1. Financial Environment  
a. Intensity and Duration 
The variables of intensity and duration influence an organization’s financial 
retrenchment choices by shaping its selection of strategy and tactics. As the intensity of 
financial scarcity varies, so too can its duration. Both affect how fast an organization 
reacts, how much it modifies, and for how long the organization must endure the 
retrenchment (Schick, 1980).  
The intensity and duration shape multiple responses. A period of 
retrenchment that is believed to be short-term may elicit strategies that employ tactics 
with short-lived effects upon the organization. Conversely, if the period of retrenchment 
is believed to be long-term, an organization may choose more comprehensive strategies 
with longer-term effects. Organizations may also use multiple strategies simultaneously 
or sequentially as the intensity and duration of retrenchment increases.  
b. Budget Flexibility 
Another factor influencing retrenchment strategy and tactics is the 
considerable need to create budget flexibility during times of retrenchment. Budget 
flexibility is difficult to achieve because times of financial retrenchment often occur at 
periods when agencies need to be most flexible and adaptive. Irene Rubin (1980) 
asserted, 
If changes are to be made, there must be flexibility in the budget to shift 
funds from one unit or program or budget line to another; if good 
personnel are to be retained, there must be sufficient flexibility to provide 
them incentives to stay on; if innovation is to occur, there must be some 
risk capital. If budget cutters are to maintain their effectiveness, they must 
have some resources with which to build and maintain coalitions. 
Otherwise, at the time leaders need the most support to make the most 
difficult decisions, they will have no support. The level of flexibility in the 
budget is thus an important factor in the ability of administrators to 
manage change; yet the level of flexibility in the budget at the time of 
retrenchment is highly problematic. (p.159) 
Thus, budget flexibility is critical if an agency is to remain effective 
during periods of financial retrenchment. Organizations should consider the amount of 
 24 
budget flexibility necessary to remain effective and choose strategies and tactics 
accordingly. 
2. Political Environment 
a. Policy Objectives 
An organization’s policy objective and financial reputation influence its 
retrenchment strategy and tactics. Each agency has its policy objectives. For established 
objectives that continue to serve a purpose and enjoy public support, an organization may 
reasonably anticipate favorable funding from Congress (Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004). 
Favorable funding does not imply an organization will not be retrenched. It merely infers 
continued support for the organization’s policy objective or, perhaps, fewer cuts when 
contrasted to competing claimants. An organization’s retrenchment strategy and choice of 
tactics are thus influenced by the amount of public and congressional support for its 
policy objective. 
An organization’s financial reputation matters. Wildavsky and Caiden 
(2004) asserted, “The agency with a reputation for economy may be praised for turning 
funds back and not get them cut the following year, whereas the agency deemed to be 
prodigal may get slashed on the grounds it must not have needed the money in the first 
place” (p. 52). An agency’s retrenchment strategy and tactics may be influenced by the 
agency’s perceived ability to obtain reliable funding from Congress. 
b. Bureaucratic Inertia 
Bureaucratic inertia affects government, quasi-government and publicly 
traded organizations. Politicians are not likely to repeal benefits that millions of citizens 
are dependent upon, without significant penalties in the following election cycle. 
According to Peters and Rose (980), “When all choices open to government are 
unpleasant, the most immediately comforting thing for a politician to do is seek a 
placebo” (p. 40). An organization may also suffer from a slow or ineffective response if 




Budgeting is a multiyear process. Agencies create budgets that strive and 
sometimes succeed at attaining a goal, but there is always an element of uncertainty 
regarding the future. As a result, “from time to time agencies are affected by emergent 
problems, current events that no one could have predicted but that will radically alter 
budgetary prospects for particular programs” (Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004, p. 52). The p 
resident, Congress, and agencies are often obligated by these unforeseen 
events to modify budgets in originally unwanted ways. This political influence cannot be 
planned or budgeted for. Nevertheless, when an externality arises, an organization may 
alter its retrenchment strategy and tactics as it stands to increase, or further decrease, its 
resources as a result of the externality. 
3. Organizational Influences 
a. Autonomy 
Autonomy is an important factor governing how an organization can 
respond to fiscal stress. Autonomy refers to the degree of control an organization has to 
raise revenue or decrease expenditures in response to fiscal stress. During times of 
financial retrenchment, organizations that have an ability to do so, traditionally choose 
some combination of increasing revenue and decreasing expenditure spending. The 
amount of autonomy an organization has to do so will significantly influence its selection 
and implementation of strategies and tactics. 
G. FINANCIAL RETRENCHMENT CHALLENGES 
Organizations experience consequences as a result of their financial retrenchment 
choices. According to Levine (1980a), public budgeting, personnel, and program 
management, dominated by resource scarcity, will require difficult management 
decisions regarding “cutbacks, tradeoffs, reallocations, organizational contractions, 
program terminations, sacrifice, and the unfreezing and freeing up of grants and 
privileges that have come to be regarded as unnegotiable rights, entitlements, and 
contracts” (p. 305).  
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 “Cutback management means managing organizational change toward lower 
levels of resource consumption and organizational activity” (Levine, 1980a, p. 306). 
Levine (1980a) identified four major challenges managers encounter during cutbacks: (1) 
Organizational acceptance of change, under austerity, will be met with resistance when 
the potential for reward or personal gain is not present; (2) professional norms, civil 
service procedures, veteran’s preference, affirmative action commitments, and collective 
bargaining agreements constrain target cuts; (3) morale, job satisfaction, and productivity 
often suffer as a result of organization contractions; and (4) creativity, innovation, and 
risk taking significantly decline under constrained resources and cutback conditions.  
Other specific challenges include the following:   
1. The Paradox of Irreducible Wholes 
“An organization cannot be reduced piece-by-piece by simply reversing the 
sequence of activities and resources by which it was built” (Levine, 1980a, p. 306). An 
organization’s expertise, political support, facilities, equipment, and resources are 
accumulated over time and are often intertwined. Management must carefully consider 
the second- and third-order effects of its financial retrenchment choices.  
2. The Management Science Paradox 
Levine (1980a) stated that organizations tend to invest in and build up their data 
systems and analytic capacity when resources are abundant. On the other hand, 
maintaining data systems and analytic capacity during times of austerity becomes 
difficult because an organization’s most talented analytic employees tend to leave for 
better opportunities elsewhere. In turn, hiring replacements becomes difficult or 
impossible because of hiring freezes. The organization and people remaining are left to 
suffer. In summary, when resources are slack or abundant, analytic capacity exceeds 
requirements, but when resources are scarce, analytic capacity can’t be maintained when 
needed the most.  
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3. Free Exiter Problem 
Levine (1980a) explained that free riders are “people who take advantage of an 
organization’s collective goods without contributing their share to achieving the 
organization’s goals” (p. 307). He further explained how management should handle free 
riders during times of growth and decline. During times of growth, an organization’s goal 
is to prevent or exclude free riders from taking advantage of the organization when 
resources are slack. However, during times of decline or contraction, an organization 
“must find ways to limit (include) ‘free exiters,’ i.e., people who seek to avoid sharing 
the ‘collective bads’ produced by the necessity to make sacrifices by either leaving the 
organization or avoiding its sacrifices” (Levine, 1980a, p. 307). Declining or contracting 
organizations dealing with austerity must “design mechanisms to limit free exiters and 
reward valuable people for remaining in the organization through its difficult times” 
(Levine, 1980a, p. 307).  
4. Tooth Fairy Syndrome 
Levine stated, “The initial prevailing attitude in the organization will usually be 
optimistic, i.e., that the decline is temporary and the cuts will be restored soon by 
someone—in some cases as remote as the tooth fairy” (Levine, 1980a, p. 307). During 
times of decline or contraction, employees usually experience resistance and cynicism in 
response to requests for voluntary budget cuts. There is a natural tendency to delay cuts, 
while middle and lower management often exhibit a “you first, then me” (Levine, 1980a, 
p. 308) attitude.  
5. Participation Paradox 
The participation paradox encourages management to seek buy-in from 
employees, especially those who will likely bear the greatest cuts. According to Levine 
(1980a), “A rational cutback process will require that some people and programs be 
asked to take greater cuts than others” (p. 308). Management often finds it difficult to 
single out people or programs; therefore, it tends to avoid deadlocks and conflict by 
implementing across-the-board cuts.  
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6. Productivity Paradox 
The productivity paradox, according to Levine (1980a) and simply stated means 
“It takes money to save money” (p. 308). Productivity improvements often require up-
front investment in training or equipment that becomes difficult to sustain when funds are 
scarce.  
7. Efficiency Paradox 
An efficient organization will find it more difficult to find cost savings during 
times of scarce resources, because it will likely have already “exhausted most of the easy 
and obvious productivity improvement strategies” (Levine, 1980a, p. 309). When cuts 
across the board are implemented, “efficient organizations are likely to be penalized more 
than their poorly performing peers because they will be forced to make much tougher 
decisions about who, what, and how cuts will be distributed” (Levine, 1980a, p. 309). 
Additionally, as often experienced in government organizations, there are few rewards or 
incentives for conserving resources, because of incremental budgeting practices.  
H. CONCLUSION 
Our review of the scholarly literature and research established a foundation for 
understanding fiscal stress, the causes of financial retrenchment, influential factors 
affecting retrenchment strategy and tactics, and the challenges of financial retrenchment 
management. 
Fiscal stress involves pressure of balancing revenue with demand for 
expenditures. The type of fiscal stress upon an organization is linked to four categories of 
scarcity: relaxed scarcity, implying sufficient resources to support growth; chronic 
scarcity, implying limited growth; acute scarcity, implying an inability to support 
incremental growth; and total scarcity, implying an inability to provide baseline 
requirements. DoD is exhibiting acute fiscal stress.  
Identifying which category accurately defines the fiscal condition of DoD 
required determining how its budget authority changed when measured in terms of 
current and constant dollars. Richard Rose (1980) outlined four ways public expenditure 
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could change when measured in this manner. They are (1) actual increases, (2) cuts 
without qualification, (3) spending squeeze, and (4) deflationary windfalls. DoD is 
exhibiting a cut without qualification. 
Determining the cause of fiscal stress was necessary because it affects 
retrenchment strategies and tactics, and facilitates identifying comparative organizations. 
Levine asserted that scarce resources are usually the underlying factor necessitating an 
organizational change and these changes occur primarily in response to internal or 
external conditions resulting from political, economic, and/or technical factors. The 
specific causes were categorized by four types: problem depletion, environmental 
entropy, political vulnerability, and organizational atrophy. DoD is exhibiting fiscal stress 
caused by the external factors of problem depletion and environmental entropy. 
Understanding the type and cause of fiscal stress, this literature review then 
examined strategies and tactics used by financially retrenched organizations. Brook’s 
categorizations of resist, delay, minimize and manage strategies form the basis of this 
examination into financial retrenchment choices. These retrenchment choices, identified 
in Chapter IV’s data examination, are ultimately being presented within a three-sector 
framework associated with the strategy and tactic to which it corresponds.  
This project’s three-sector matrix focuses specifically on financial choices 
designed to strategically minimize and manage retrenchment, because DoD is 
legislatively required to administer forthcoming budget cuts in accordance with the BCA 
of 2011. Thus, DoD exhibits minimize and management strategies and tactics that 
produce financial choices designed to deal with its retrenchment.  
These choices produce significant expenditure reductions and have long-term 
effects upon organizational effectiveness. Resultantly, there are many challenges facing 
DoD managers as they make difficult financial retrenchment choices. These financial 
retrenchment choices are therefore worthy of comparison to the historical choices of 
comparable government, quasi-government, and publicly traded organizations in order to 
determine if DoD’s choices are characteristic of an organization under similar fiscal 
stress. 
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Chapter III will discuss the characteristics sought in a comparative organization. 
Subsequently, the selected organizations are presented along with a discussion of their 
similarities and differences to the stated characteristics and will close with 
acknowledgements of our research limitations. 
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III. COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT, QUASI-GOVERNMENT 
AND PUBLICLY TRADED ORGANIZATIONS 
This report seeks organizations spanning government, quasi-government, and 
publicly traded sectors to examine similarities and differences in financial retrenchment 
choices and compare their choices to the DoD’s. The intent of this chapter is to establish 
and define the characteristics of reasonably comparative organizations, identify 
comparable organizations, discuss their similarities and differences to the stated 
characteristics, and acknowledge the limitations of this comparison.  
A. COMPARATIVE ORGANIZATIONS—CHARACTERISTICS 
It is necessary to define characteristics associated with other government, quasi-
government, and publicly traded organizations that compare to the DoD and its current 
fiscal environment. These characteristics enable the selection of suitable comparative 
organizations whose financial retrenchment choices can then be analyzed and ultimately 
compared to those of the DoD.  
Drawing on the literature of the previous chapter, we identify four characteristics. 
The first two characteristics address the fiscal environment and identify organizations 
experiencing real, not perceived, fiscal stress. These are (1) the type and cause of fiscal 
stress and (2) the duration of fiscal stress. 
The final two characteristics address an organization’s response to fiscal stress 
and the autonomy the organization has to manage the stress. This identifies organizations, 
bound by similar constraints, whose responses pursue comparative strategies. These are 
(3) the strategic response of the organization and (4) the amount of autonomy an 
organization has to manage fiscal stress. 
These characteristics enable us to select suitable comparative organizations whose 
financial retrenchment choices can be analyzed and ultimately compared to the DoD.  
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1. Type/Cause of Fiscal Stress 
Management’s retrenchment choices are affected by the type and cause of fiscal 
stress (Levine, 1980b; Schick, 1980). Therefore, the type and cause of fiscal stress are 
important factors governing how an organization responds to fiscal stress. The type of 
fiscal stress is defined by the level of scarcity associated with available funds. Funding 
scarcity could be relaxed, chronic, acute, and total (Schick, 1980). The cause of fiscal 
stress could be the result of internal or external conditions that arise from political, 
economic and/or technical factors. Resultantly, they can be categorized into four types: 
problem depletion, environmental entropy, political vulnerability, and organizational 
atrophy (Levine, 1980b). 
The DoD exhibits acute fiscal stress caused by external factors of problem 
depletion and environmental entropy. Termination of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, 
coupled with the nation-wide economic recession of 2008, placed downward pressures on 
the federal budget as expenditures exceedingly surpassed revenues and deficits became 
unsustainable. Resultantly, the BCA established discretionary spending caps, 
necessitating the DoD cut $500 billion between FY 2013–2022. Challenged by financial 
retrenchment, the DoD must now make choices within the framework of a new fiscal 
reality and fewer resources, as available resources are insufficient to cover the 
incremental rise in program costs. Therefore, comparative government, quasi-
government, and publicly traded organizations should exhibit acute fiscal stress resulting 
from external factors. 
2. Duration of Fiscal Stress 
The expected duration of fiscal stress influences an organization’s choice of 
strategy and tactics. The selected financial retrenchment strategy may be discrete or, if 
the duration of retrenchment increases, sequential as the organizations attempts to 
progressively manage retrenchment.  
The BCA of 2011, and the continued prospect of sequester, directly contribute to 
DoD’s fiscal outlook by legislatively reducing budget authority $500 billion between FY 
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2013–2022. Thus, comparative government, quasi-government, and publicly traded 
organizations should exhibit fiscal stress with a realistically expected multi-year duration. 
3. Strategic Response 
Organizations, faced with retrenchment, may choose to resist, delay, minimize or 
manage fiscal stress. The strategic response does not need to be discrete. An 
organization’s response may employ one or more strategies simultaneously or 
progressively as retrenchment proves more severe. 
DoD has sequentially responded to fiscal stress and now exhibits financial 
retrenchment choices designed to fulfill minimization and management strategies. 
Specifically, DoD used minimization tactics on March 1, 2013, when sequestration 
mandated a $37 billion reduction to DoD’s current year budget. Now, DoD is compelled 
to manage a 10-year BCA requirement to reduce budget authority by $500 billion. 
Therefore, comparative government, quasi-government and publicly traded organizations 
should exhibit financial retrenchment choices intended to fulfill minimization and 
management strategies. 
4. Autonomy 
DoD does not have complete autonomy. Because DoD is an agency within the 
U.S. federal government, DoD cannot raise revenue. It does reserve the ability, and duty, 
to request additional funding from Congress when unable to meet agency objectives. 
However, this does not constitute the autonomy associated with independently raising 
revenue through taxation, borrowing or inter-governmental transfers. 
DoD, therefore, focuses on expenditure management during times of financial 
retrenchment. Controlling expenditure spending is the primary manner in which DoD can 
comply with program ceilings and targets that originate from austere financial 
environments. Resultantly, comparative government, quasi-government, and publicly 
traded organizations should exhibit financial choices designed to limit expenditure 
spending as a result of their fiscal environment. 
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Consequently, we seek comparative government, quasi-government and publicly 
traded organizations exhibiting multi-year acute fiscal stress resulting from external 
factors to which organizations are demonstrating financial retrenchment choices designed 
to fulfill minimization and management strategies. 
B. COMPARATIVE ORGANIZATIONS—DOCUMENT REVIEW 
This section presents the organizations identified as comparable and examines 
their similarities and differences to the stated characteristics.  
1. Government Organizations 
Government organizations are numerous and varied. They exist domestically and 
internationally. They can comprise several echelons, such as federal, state, or municipal. 
Echelons themselves contain agencies, departments, or offices that perform functions 
requiring financial support. For this report, we selected U.S. state governments for the 
purpose of examining their financial retrenchment choices and comparing them with the 
DoD. 
a. Why the United States?  
Selecting government organizations within the United States improves the 
likelihood that social, economic, and political systems are comparable to DoD’s 
operating environment. Furthermore, when external factors, such as problem depletion 
and environmental entropy, affect the United States government there is a considerable 
probability that other U.S. government organizations are influenced due to the dominant 
fiscal and political position of the federal government. Finally, people of the same social 
and political dynamics, when faced with financial retrenchment, are likely to respond 
with financial choices that are bound by and reflect their social, economic, and political 
systems. 
b. Why State Level Government? 
State government organizations are selected because of the size and the 
reach of their budgets, the extensive political considerations influencing their budgets, 
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and how both combine to affect the financial retrenchment choices of decision makers. 
Additionally, because most state governments seek to maintain a balanced budget, there 
are increased prospects that strategies and tactics to reduce expenditure spending will be 
adopted during times of multi-year acute fiscal stress. 
DoD’s discretionary budget is the largest of all government agencies. 
Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 2012 National Defense budget was $669.6 
billion in constant dollars, representing approximately 56 percent of the U.S. federal 
government’s discretionary spending in 2012 (OMB, 2013a). Resultantly, DoD 
operations, assets, and contracts are diverse and have considerable effects upon the U.S. 
economy. 
State governments have sizable budgets, economies, and populations 
along with a broad spectrum of agencies and programs. Formulation of state government 
budgets garners substantial political consideration because budgets reflect the political 
priorities of an organization and affect its population and economy. Thus, the political, 
economic and social factors surrounding financial retrenchment choices, and the effects 
stemming from them, significantly influence decision-makers. Because the ultimate 
objective is to examine financial retrenchment choices of comparative organizations to 
those of DoD, selecting government organizations whose decision makers face similar 
political, economic, and social pressures is significant.  
Finally, states have full autonomy to raise revenue through taxation, 
borrowing or intra-government transfers. However, most states exhibit a balanced budget 
requirement. Therefore, the probability exists that expenditure spending reductions will 
be implemented in times of acute fiscal stress. 
c. Why California (2010), Massachusetts (2009), and New Jersey 
(2010)?  
In Arnett’s 2012 analysis of measures and responses of U.S. states to fiscal 
stress, Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR) of all 50 states were used to 
build four financial indexes measuring fiscal stress upon a state government’s budget 
(Arnett, 2012). These financial indexes measured cash solvency, budget solvency, long-
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run solvency, and service-level solvency (Arnett 2012; Groves, Godsey, & Shulman, 
1981; Wang, Dennis, & Tu, 2007). 
Cash solvency reflects the level of current assets available to cover current 
liabilities or simply a “government’s ability to generate enough cash or liquidity to pay its 
bills” (Groves et al., 1981, p. 6). Budget solvency reflects a government’s “ability to 
generate sufficient revenues over its normal budgetary period to meet its expenditure 
obligations and not incur deficits” (Groves et al., 1981, p. 6). Long-run solvency reflects 
the “long-run ability of a government to pay all the cost of doing business, including 
expenditure obligations that normally appear in each annual budget, as well as those that 
show up only in the years in which they must be paid” (Groves et al., 1981, p. 6). Finally, 
service-level solvency, which is a composite of tax, revenue, and expense per capita 
ratios, reflects “whether a government can provide the level and quality of services 
required for the general health and welfare of a community” (Groves et al., 1981, p. 6). 
Using data collected from 2009 CAFRs, Arnett found seven out of 50 
states exhibited high amounts of fiscal stress across all four solvency index ratios (Arnett, 
2012, p. 100). These were California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, and New York. Of these states, California, New York, and Massachusetts 
had the largest FY 2009 state general funds (National Association of State Budget 
Officers [NASBO], 2009). California, New York, and New Jersey are among the highest 
populations (U.S. Census, 2010). Consequently, California, New York, New Jersey, and 
Massachusetts’ 2009 CAFRs were examined against the characteristics required of a 
comparative government organization. 
This examination revealed that all four states exhibited multi-year acute 
fiscal stress resulting from external factors. However, California and New York did not 
demonstrate financial retrenchment choices designed to fulfill minimization and 
management strategies in 2009. Therefore, an examination of California and New York’s 
2010 CAFRs was performed. This examination revealed both states continued to exhibit 
multi-year acute fiscal stress. However, in 2010, California demonstrated financial 
retrenchment choices designed to fulfill minimization and management strategies while 
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New York did not. Therefore, we selected California (2010), Massachusetts (2009), and 
New Jersey (2009) for comparative analysis. 
d. California (2010) 
(1) Similarities to stated criteria. California exhibited multi-
year acute fiscal stress resulting from external factors. The state reported continued job 
losses in FY 2010 with the unemployment rate reaching a high of 12.6 percent in March 
2010. The state reported a decrease in tax revenue of nearly $2.9 billion. Revenue from 
personal income taxes had decreased $1.6 billion and corporation tax revenue decreased 
$1.3 billion. The state’s “General Fund ended the FY with assets of $12.9 billion, 
liabilities of $32.5 billion, and fund balance reserves of $1.3 billion, leaving the general 
fund with an unreserved fund deficit of $20.9 billion” (State of California, 2010a, p.15). 
California reported that its financial condition was the result of the 2008 nation-wide 
recession and its own weakened economy (State of California, 2010a).  
California’s financial choices did limit expenditure spending, albeit 
modestly. General fund expenditures were decreased by $5.4 billion. Program budgets 
whose General Fund support was cut include K–12 education, corrections, public 
assistance, and Medicaid. 
(2) Differences to stated criteria. California, despite modestly 
limiting its expenditure spending, used its autonomy to a great extent. Solutions included 
new federal funding, short-term tax increases, loans, transfers, and funding shifts (State 
of California, 2010a). 
California also exhibited fiscal stress resulting from internal 
factors. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System has a large unfunded 
liability and federal and state maintenance-of-effort requirements and other legal 
constraints increased costs and substantially restricted budgeted programs that could be 
reduced (State of California, 2010a). 
 38 
e. Massachusetts (2009) 
(1) Similarities to stated criteria. Massachusetts exhibited 
multi-year acute fiscal stress resulting from external factors. The state reported a decrease 
in tax revenue of nearly $2.7 billion. This was the result of decreased income tax 
payments, sales, and use taxes. “Because of the drop in tax revenues, the Commonwealth 
ended the year with a nearly $1.4B structural deficit” (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
2009, p. 34). Massachusetts reported that its financial condition was the consequence of 
the deepening nation-wide recession resulting from problems in the subprime mortgage 
and other credit markets (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2009). 
Massachusetts was required to close a budget gap of $479 million 
resulting from the projected decrease in expected tax revenue. Expenditure reductions 
were also limited another $943 million by in-year budgetary reductions. These reductions 
affected direct local aid, state pensions, earmarks, transportation, health and human 
services, and subsidies to authorities. 
(2) Differences to stated criteria. Massachusetts, to alleviate 
strain on programs and services, used its autonomy to draw funds from reserve accounts, 
acquire additional federal stimulus funding and commercially borrow. Massachusetts also 
employed resists tactics, specifically budget gamesmanship. 
f. New Jersey (2010) 
(1) Similarities to stated criteria. New Jersey exhibited multi-
year acute fiscal stress resulting from external factors. The State’s budgeted revenue 
experienced a significant decline of $3.5 billion from its originally adopted budget (State 
of New Jersey, 2009). The state reported an unemployment rate of 10.1 percent, declining 
personal income rates, a 20 percent decline in motor vehicle registrations, and a 
depressed housing sector; all of which affected General Fund revenues and reflect the 
economic recession. Both national and local economic factors were attributed for the 
decline (State of New Jersey, 2009). 
New Jersey is constitutionally required to maintain a balanced 
budget. Consequently, there were significant budget cuts proposed by the government 
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and the eventual financial choices did limit expenditure spending. As a budgeting 
practice, the state budgets as though it will receive maximum federal grant dollars into its 
General Fund. Therefore, it administered budget reductions to eight department and 
programs when there was a $2 billion shortfall in federal grant funding. 
(2) Differences to stated criteria. New Jersey exercised its 
autonomy to acquire additional federal stimulus funding and used dedicated reserve 
funding to ensure the General Fund remained solvent in FY 2009. 
New Jersey also exhibited fiscal stress resulting from internal 
factors. “The state had not fully funded its pension plans for several years” (State of New 
Jersey, 2009, p. 5). As of June 2008, this underfunding, coupled with investment decline, 
led to an unfunded accrued liability for state and local pension plans of $34.4 billion and 
an Other Post-employment Benefit unfunded accrued liability of $55.9 billion (State of 
New Jersey, 2009). 
2. Quasi-Government Organizations 
Quasi-government organizations “possess legal characteristics of both the 
government and private sectors” (Moe, 2001, p. 290). Quasi-government organizations 
are intended to offer strategic products or services the government deems necessary for 
the greater public good. They typically consist of natural monopolies, such as energy, 
postal services, railways, and telecommunications.  
There are many kinds of quasi-governmental or hybrid organizations with varying 
degrees of legal and behavioral characteristics. Moe (2001) categorized them as (1) 
quasi-official agencies, (2) government-sponsored entities, (3) federally funded research 
and development corporations, (4) agency-related nonprofit organizations, (5) venture 
capital funds, (6) congressionally chartered nonprofit organizations, and (7) 
instrumentalities of indeterminate character.  
The United States Postal Service (USPS) and National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation (Amtrak) are quasi-official agencies that are afforded “considerable 
autonomy from regular lines of accountability to central managerial agencies as well as to 
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the General Accountability Office (GAO). It is not, however, as is often argued, protected 
from political influences” (Moe, 2001, p. 293).  
USPS and Amtrak were selected for comparative analysis based on their 
similarities to the DoD in exhibiting multi-year acute fiscal stress resulting from external 
factors to which the organization is demonstrating financial retrenchment choices 
designed to fulfill minimization and management strategies. 
a. United States Postal Service (USPS) 
(1) Similarities to stated criteria. The USPS exhibited multi-
year acute fiscal stress resulting from external factors. “As the USPS’s finances have 
deteriorated, its ability to absorb operating losses has been diminished. Between FY 2005 
and FY 2011, the USPS’s debt rose from $0 to $13 billion” (Kosar, 2012, p. 2). 
Additionally, the USPS faces rising costs associated with its manpower intensive 
workforce, retiree benefits, pensions, and health care. In 2008, the USPS’s net profit 
margin eroded as customers continued to increase internet accessibility and chose it as a 
preferred means of communication and business. Thus, as revenues decreased, fixed costs 
became unsustainable. “Looking forward, the USPS projects that, absent additional 
action, annual financial losses will escalate over the next decade to $33 billion in fiscal 
year 2020” (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2010, p. 12). 
The USPS must rely heavily on expenditure management to 
achieve fiscal solvency. The USPS’s expenditure management options include reduction 
of the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) mandated Postal Service 
Retiree Health Benefits Fund (PSRHBF) payments, pension costs, contributions toward 
employee health care premiums and life insurance, retail and nonretail facilities, and mail 
delivery service, as well as increasing the USPS’s power to control labor costs (Kosar, 
2012). Strategically, the USPS has demonstrated financial retrenchment choices designed 
to fulfill minimization and management strategies. 
The USPS lacks autonomy in its ability to raise revenue and reduce 
expenditures. Prior to 1971, Congress provided annual appropriations to the U.S Post 
Office Department (USPOD) and was heavily involved in routine operations such as the 
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selection of managers and pricing of postal services. In 1970, the Postal Reorganization 
Act (PRA), made the USPOD an “independent establishment of the executive branch” 
(39 U.S.C. § 201), renaming it the USPS. Today, the USPS continues to receive an 
annual appropriation of approximately $100 million, approximately 13 percent of its 
operating budget. This reorganization reduces congressional oversight but did not 
eliminate it. The PRA also established the Postal Rate Commission to oversee postal 
operations, set mail rates, and hold hearings to approve USPS proposed mail 
classification or scope of service changes (Kosar, 2012), thereby limiting the USPS’s 
autonomy. 
(2) Differences to stated criteria. The USPS differs from DoD 
in its ability to generate revenues, borrow money from the U.S. Treasury, and its 
requirement to prefund retiree benefits. Although USPS was designed to be self-
sustaining, its ability to expand or reduce products and services in response to market 
trends is hampered by federal law. In an attempt to delay or alleviate its cash shortage, 
USPS requested a reduction and deferral of the PAEA mandated PSRHBF payment, 
which required “USPS to prefund its future retirees’ health benefits at a cost of 
approximately $5.6 billion per year for 10 years” (Kosar, 2010, p. 3). Additionally, USPS 
attempted to offset its operating losses by borrowing $3 billion a year, within a statutory 
debt limit of $15 billion. 
b. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) 
(1) Similarities to stated criteria. Amtrak exhibited multi-year 
acute fiscal stress resulting from external factors. Amtrak  
has been in a shaky financial condition ever since it was created by the 
federal government more than 30 years ago. Although Amtrak was 
established as a private, for-profit company, it has needed—and 
received—federal subsidies every year since it began providing service in 
1971. (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 2003, p. iii) 
Both passenger and freight rail have experienced long-term acute 
fiscal stress because of “a significant decline in market share by the middle of the 20th 
century as travelers and shippers turned increasingly to airlines, trucks, and automobiles 
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to meet their transportation need” (CBO, 2003, p. xi). Additionally, “Amtrak’s data show 
that only one of the railroad’s 40 routes covers all its operating costs. For the remaining 
39 routes, Amtrak loses an average of $53 for each passenger” (Scheinberg, 1998, p. 7). 
Amtrak has demonstrated financial retrenchment choices designed 
to fulfill minimization and management strategies. Financial retrenchment tactics include 
reduced staffing, deferred maintenance programs, reduced inventory, and reduced 
frequency or elimination of unprofitable routes. 
Amtrak lacks significant autonomy, as it is highly regulated by 
Congress. Legislative provisions “created a politically appointed board of directors, 
emphasized a nationwide rail system, preserved expensive compensation provisions for 
laid-off workers, and forced Amtrak to provide discounted fares for people with 
disabilities” (CBO, 2003, p. x). The Interstate Commerce Commission also complicated 
matters when it implemented rigid regulation that virtually eliminated Amtrak’s ability to 
adapt to changing market conditions (CBO, 2003). When Amtrak proposed discontinuing 
service in unprofitable routes, the organization encountered opposition by “a range of 
interests to see passenger train service continued in potentially affected communities” 
(Scheinberg, 1998, p. 7).  
(2) Differences to stated criteria. Amtrak was intended to be a 
self-sustaining for-profit organization. As a quasi-official agency, it can raise revenue and 
borrow money for capital investments. Additionally, Amtrak receives subsidies and 
grants, including $2.2 billion from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. 
The USPS and Amtrak were two organizations, of substantial size 
and complexity, that met the stated characteristics for comparative analysis. Both 
displayed multi-year acute fiscal stress and financial retrenchment choices designed to 
fulfill minimization and management strategies.  
3. Publicly Traded Organizations 
This report selects publicly traded firms headquartered within the United States 
for the purpose of examining their financial retrenchment choices and comparing them 
with the DoD. 
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a. Why the United States? 
Publicly traded firms are owned and operated by private citizens. 
However, government regulation often impacts organizational operations and financial 
choices. Thus, selecting firms within the United States improves the likelihood of a 
comparable socioeconomic and political environment. 
b. Why Fortune 500 Companies? 
The DoD’s FY 2013 discretionary budget was approximately $527.5 
billion (OUSD[C]), 2013b, p. A-7). Therefore, in this project, seeks publicly traded 
companies with substantial size and complexity. Forbes Fortune 500 lists publicly owned 
companies, all of which have annual revenues in the billions of dollars. These companies 
are also required by government regulation to publish comprehensive financial records. 
These records provide comprehensive financial information for data examination. 
c. Why Ford and IBM? 
Both Ford and IBM are publicly traded firms based in the United States 
that are of sufficient size and complexity. These firms also exhibit multi-year acute fiscal 
stress caused by external factors. In their response to fiscal stress these companies 
demonstrated financial retrenchment choices designed to fulfill minimization and 
management strategies. 
d. Ford Motor Co  
(1) Similarities to stated criteria. Ford exhibited multi-year 
acute fiscal stress resulting from external factors. These factors include fierce 
international competition and the 2008 nation-wide recession. Table 2 shows the total 
percent of automotive shares during 1995—2011. As indicated, international competition 
severely eroded Ford’s market share from its high of 26 percent in 1995 to a 14 percent 
low in 2008. The 2008 nation-wide recession continued to worsen Ford’s fiscal condition, 
when sales plunged 32 percent to their lowest level in 25 years (George, 2012, p. 2).  
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Table 2.   Percentage of Automotive Share 1995–2011 (from Shein & Bell, 2012) 
Ford demonstrated financial retrenchment choices designed to 
fulfill minimization and management strategies. In 2002, the company cut approximately 
20,000 jobs and closed numerous plants. Four years later, Ford launched a major 
restructuring plan which cut an additional 30,000 jobs and put 14 plants worldwide in 
idle status over the next six years. Ford made significant efforts to cut vehicle 
development costs by “engineering a car once to serve multiple markets worldwide” 
(Shein & Bell, 2012, p. 4). 
(2) Differences to stated criteria. Ford is more autonomous in 
its ability to respond to fiscal stress than the DoD. Ford raised $23.6 billion in financing 
from bankers and investors while mortgaging company assets to include its iconic brand 
logo (Johnson & Krisher, 2008). However, Ford’s autonomy is limited by its fiduciary 
responsibilities to stockholders, government regulations, and union contracts. Ford’s 
ability to raise capital is also limited by its credit rating, leverage ratios, and the cost of 
capital. Therefore, in times of acute fiscal stress, it is likely that cost cutting measures 
will result in a reduction to expenditure spending as managers make retrenchment choices 
designed to fulfill minimization and management strategies.  
Ford also exhibits acute fiscal stress resulting from internal factors. 
The United Autoworkers Union’s (UAW) significant power and influence limit Ford's 
ability to control and adjust labor costs. By 2009, the UAW’s salaries and benefits were 
significantly above industry average and unsustainable. “The Big 3 paid employees 
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$73.21 per hour, inclusive of benefits compared to $44.17 for Japanese makers” (Sherk, 
2008). Legacy costs to include retiree lifetime benefits in the form of pensions, life 
insurance, unemployment benefits, and disability payments also drove up labor costs 
(Taylor, 2007). 
e. International Business Machines (IBM)  
(1) Similarities to stated criteria. IBM exhibited multi-year 
acute fiscal stress resulting from external factors. In the mid-1980s, IBM was an 
established company that produced well regarded and universally recognized mainframe 
computing products. However in 1984, customer demand shifted from large mainframe 
computers to networked mobile personal computers. The result was a multi-year decline 
in sales, assets, and equity. Competitors developed and introduced new technologies that 
dramatically impacted IBM’s revenue. Revenues dropped 146 percent in 1991, 60 
percent in 1992, and another 60 percent in 1993 (Applegate, Austin, & Collins, 2009, p. 
3). The major cause of this multi-year fiscal stress was environmental entropy, as IBM’s 
mainframe business became obsolete and competitors successfully marketed emerging 
technologies.  
IBM demonstrated financial retrenchment choices designed to 
fulfill minimization and management strategies The company cut costs in small and large 
ways with both short and long-term effects to remain solvent. In early 1993, IBM had 
initiated a $3.7 billion restructuring plan resulting in the elimination of 40,000 jobs. 
(2)  Differences to stated criteria. A major difference to the 
stated characteristics is IBM’s autonomy. IBM is able to raise revenue through the 
issuance of stocks, bonds, and loans. IBM also has the ability to freely divest 
underperforming subordinate units from its business portfolio. 
C. COMPARATIVE ORGANIZATIONS—LIMITATIONS 
There are limitations associated with finding comparative organizations because 
of the size and complexity of the DoD. The DoD’s budget, its global presence, and its 
economic influence make it a uniquely large and complex organization. The DoD varies 
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in different ways from each of the comparable government, quasi-government, and 
publicly traded organizations. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In Chapter III, we defined comparable characteristics of government, quasi-
government, and publicly traded organizations and identified the similarities and 
differences of each to the stated criteria. The chapter closed with an acknowledgement of 
research limitations.  
In Chapter IV, we identify financial retrenchment choices and associate them with 
a retrenchment strategy and tactic. Then a three-sector analytical framework is developed 
and the data incorporated for analysis. The chapter concludes with a presentation of 
results. 
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IV. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
In this chapter, financial retrenchment choices are identified and associated to a 
retrenchment strategy and tactic. Then a three-sector analytical framework is developed 
and the data incorporated for analysis. The chapter concludes with a presentation of 
results. 
A. COMPARATIVE ORGANIZATIONS—DATA EXAMINATION 
Having selected suitable comparative government, quasi-government and publicly 
traded organizations, we examine their financial retrenchment choices. This section 
provides data examination of the key financial retrenchment choices of comparable 
government, quasi-government, and publicly traded organizations. The financial 
retrenchment choices are presented and associated to a retrenchment strategy and tactic. 
The next section develops a three-sector analytical framework to which the data is 
incorporated and analyzed.  
1. Government Organizations 
a. People 
(1) Financial retrenchment choices: minimize. California 
utilized furloughs and restructured the work week. The state extensively used this tactic 
in 2009 and continued it into 2010 when state workers were ordered to take three unpaid 
days off per month until the 2010 budget was in place at an unspecified time. The action 
was expected to affect 150,000 state workers and save $150 million a month. Also, the 
governor attempted to cut two state holidays, eliminate time and a half for holiday 
workers and offer four-day work weeks with 10-hour work-days.  
Massachusetts utilized furloughs as short-term financial 
retrenchment choices. The state furloughed 5,000 executive branch employees for up to 
five days. The state also sought additional furlough concessions from union workers in 
order to prevent additional layoffs. 
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New Jersey continued a hiring freeze in 2009 and implemented 
furloughs. “Over the past two years, through attrition and an ongoing hiring freeze, the 
state, reduced the size of the state workforce by nearly 2,000 positions” (State of New 
Jersey, 2008, p. 3). Then in May of 2009, the New Jersey governor issued a series of one-
day closures affecting 36 departments and agencies in an effort to help close a  
$4.4 billion budget shortfall (Hester, 2009). 
California, Massachusetts and New Jersey’s financial retrenchment 
choices demonstrate tactics designed to minimize the effects of financial retrenchment. 
These organizations reduced expenditures by implementing hiring freezes and furloughs. 
These tactics were short-term, immediately produced savings, and were intended to avert 
more drastic cuts to the workforce. 
(2) Financial retrenchment choices: manage. California utilized 
work force reductions and restructured pay and benefits for state employees. The state 
implemented a five percent workforce reduction to achieve $449.6 million in savings 
(State of California, 2010c). The 2010 budget reduced state employee salaries another 
five percent following atop a ten percent decrease the previous year. Furthermore, 
comprehensive pension reform was achieved through collective bargaining and 
legislation. This increased the full benefits retirement age for most new employees, 
increased employee contributions towards pensions, and ended pension spiking (State of 
California, 2010c).  
Massachusetts utilized work force reductions and restructured pay 
and benefits for state employees. Between 2008 and 2009, 4,200 state workers attrited or 
were cut with 2,300 of those losses coming in 2009 alone. Furthermore, state workers’ 
health insurance contributions were changed from a system based on date of hire to one 
based on salary levels and affordability, thereby saving $51 million.  
New Jersey utilized work force reductions, offered early 
retirements, and restructured pay and benefits for state employees. The 2009 state budget 
attempted to save $350 million through a workforce reduction of 3,000 personnel and 
implementation of an Early Retirement Incentive Program (State of New Jersey, 2009). 
Finally, “the state raised the retirement age for new employees from 55 to 60, increased 
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pension contributions, and capped the defined benefit pension for new employees (State 
of New Jersey, 2009, p. 4). 
California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey’s financial 
retrenchment choices demonstrate tactics designed to manage the effects of financial 
retrenchment. These organizations reduced their workforces over the course of the year 
and restructured pay and benefits. New Jersey also implemented early retirements. These 
tactics were slower at harvesting savings than hiring furloughs. They also have longer-
term effects upon the organization and its employees. 
During the time period covered by this project, leadership changes 
were noted in California and New Jersey. However, no connection can be established 
which associates the leadership change to a financial retrenchment choice. California’s 
incumbent governor, in particular, was constitutionally prevented from seeking a third 
term. Thus, a leadership change was not the result of a financial retrenchment choice. In 
both states, new governors were appointed through general election, not special election 
resulting from the fiscal condition of the state. Therefore, these leadership changes will 
not be reflected in the three-sector matrix. 
b. Performance 
(1) Financial retrenchment choices: minimize. California cut 
programs and tried to burden share the effects of fiscal stress with federal and local 
governments. The state also attempted to eliminate non-essential services and programs. 
The final budget saved some programs, but still removed their funding for 2010. Also, 
California sought to burden share by seeking reimbursement from the federal government 
for funding owed to the state, along with its fair share of federal funding under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. California also reduced funding to local 
governments to balance its budget. 
Massachusetts cut programs, centralized decision-making, 
highlighted small efficiency improvements, and tried to burden share with local 
governments. Multiple non-essential programs were cut or their funding was removed. 
Decision-making was centralized in multiple departments, mostly through the 
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consolidation of funding accounts, to provide department heads budget flexibility. The 
state’s budget highlights numerous small efficiency and productivity improvements, 
many not yet realized, and takes credit for their savings. Most efficiency gains were 
simple realignments of responsibilities, as well as funding, decision-making, or 
technological improvements. Finally, Massachusetts burden shared by reducing aid to 
local municipalities, but offset the effect by granting additional authorities to 
municipalities.  
New Jersey cut programs, highlighted small efficiency 
improvements, centralized decision-making, and attempted to burden share with local 
municipalities. Program cuts targeted multiple non-essential programs. For example, New 
Jersey realized $1.1 million in savings by eliminating the Mobile Unit from the Motor 
Vehicle Commission acknowledging that customers arrange their own transportation to 
scheduled appointments. Minor efficiency improvements included the consolidation of 
911 call centers, office supply control programs, and the reduction of outsourced website 
maintenance. Finally, New Jersey reduced the level of aid to municipalities by $162 
million (State of New Jersey, 2009). 
California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey’s financial 
retrenchment choices demonstrate tactics designed to minimize the effects of financial 
retrenchment. These organizations sought small efficiencies, cut non-essential programs, 
centralized decision–making, and shared the burden of retrenchment. These tactics 
immediately produced savings with very little impact upon the organization. They were 
also intended to avert or reduce other more significant cuts to programs and services. 
(2) Financial retrenchment choices: manage. In 2010, 
California did not exhibit any long-term financial retrenchment choices that addressed 
performance tactics. There was no organizational restructuring, reduction in capital 
assets, privatization actions, large scale efficiency improvements or long-term 
transformation efforts. California focused on short-term tactics, discussed previously, and 
did not attempt to realign, transform, or restructure government in order to combat long-
term financial retrenchment or avert future crisis. 
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Massachusetts implemented organizational restructuring to gain 
efficiencies. It converted county sheriffs into state sheriffs, and consolidated numerous 
independent transportation bureaus into the Massachusetts Department of Transportation. 
New Jersey conducted organizational restructuring and eliminated 
two cabinet level agencies—the Department of Personnel and the Commerce 
Commission—and consolidated the essential functions of those agencies into other 
Executive Branch departments or agencies (State of New Jersey, 2009). 
Massachusetts and New Jersey organizationally restructured, 
thereby demonstrating one performance-related tactic designed to manage the effects of 
financial retrenchment. In both states, this tactic was slow to enact, and thus produce 
savings. Cuts and realignments of this magnitude required legislative approval, and both 
met with resistance. In the process, New Jersey’s legislature spared a third, cabinet-level 
agency from elimination. This illustrates difficulty in implementing long-term 
retrenchment choices within a dynamic organization. 
c. Budget 
(1) Financial retrenchment choices: minimize. California 
targeted cuts and delayed spending as short-term financial retrenchment budget choices. 
Subject to constitutional, statutory, and court-ordered spending requirements, almost 
every program’s funding was reduced in FY 2010. Also, California attempted to delay 
spending by extending the repayment date of $231 million in loans to the State Highway 
Account (State of California, 2010d). 
Massachusetts targeted cuts, attempted to defer maintenance on 
government facilities, used performance metrics, and renegotiated contracts as short-term 
financial retrenchment budget choices. Targeted cuts included elimination of $40 million 
in earmarks. Also, 190 line items were held to their baseline, while others were targeted 
for investment. The state attempted to defer maintenance by reforming its maintenance 
model for state facilities. The new model funded only urgent repairs and deferred 
avoidable maintenance. Finally, performance metrics and contract renegotiation were 
 52 
used, as the state expanded its Medicaid pay-for-performance initiatives and renegotiated 
prescription drug contracts to promote less costly generic prescription medications. 
New Jersey targeted cuts and renegotiated contracts. Funding cuts 
targeted many programs, including higher education, hospitals, arts, history, and tourism. 
However, mental health services, New Jersey’s transit system, and state renal assistance 
programs were not affected. Renegotiated contracts included the state’s natural gas 
supply contract, an action that recognized $4.1 million in cost avoidance over three years. 
New Jersey also sought a new provider for workers’ compensation managed care 
services, and centralized its system for evaluating contractors to avoid repeatedly hiring 
poor performing vendors. 
California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey’s financial 
retrenchment choices demonstrate tactics designed to minimize the effects of financial 
retrenchment. These organizations implemented targeted budget cuts, renegotiated 
contracts, focused on performance, and deferred maintenance. These tactics immediately 
produced savings with minimal impact upon the organization’s workforce and 
infrastructure. Targeted cuts did affect programs and services, but because they were not 
across-the-board cuts they could be administered in a way that minimized the effects. The 
savings produced by these tactics were meant to offset, or prevent more serious cuts with 
longer-term ramifications. 
(2) Financial retrenchment choices: manage. California 
implemented spending freezes, leased back surplus property, and initiated a budget 
reform. The state implemented spending freezes, holding spending essentially flat 
compared to the prior year (State of California, 2010d). California then chose to lease 
back 11 office buildings “for a period of 20 years with first right of refusal if the 
properties are put up for sale” (State of California, 2010d, p. 23). This tactic recognized 
$1.2 billion in revenue. Finally, California conceived of a constitutional amendment to 
substantially strengthen the state’s rainy day fund in order to avoid future boom-and-bust 
cycles (State of California, 2010d). This budget reform, goes before voters in 2014, and, 
if passed, “will require more stringent deposit requirements in good budget years to 
provide a greater cushion for bad budget years” (State of California, 2010d, p. 2). 
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Massachusetts leased back golf courses previously managed by the 
Department of Conservation and Recreation. The state also restructured its budget by 
creating a transportation fund that directed transportation revenue to pay for all 
transportation-related expenses. This tactic was expected to bring transparency to state-
wide transportation costs and show the extent to which transportation expenses actually 
need to be subsidized by the general fund.  
New Jersey implemented a spending freeze, terminated or 
renegotiated leases on surplus property, and leveraged its buying power. The state froze 
spending at its current level for FY 2009 (State of New Jersey, 2009). Next, New Jersey 
consolidated staff into vacant state-owned facilities and saved $5.1 million from the 
termination or renegotiation of 13 leases (State of New Jersey, 2009). Then, New Jersey 
joined the Western States Contracting Alliance to leverage its buying power and obtain 
lower vendor prices (State of New Jersey, 2009).  
Finally, New Jersey restructured its budget through various 
legislative acts. The state created a long-term obligation and capital expenditure fund to 
limit the use of surplus accounts to fund long-term obligations in times of retrenchment. 
The governor issued an executive order requiring recurring revenues match recurring 
expenditures in future budget proposals. New Jersey also proposed a constitutional 
amendment that required public approval of new debt. 
California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey’s financial 
retrenchment choices demonstrate tactics designed to manage the effects of financial 
retrenchment. Commonly used tactics included spending freezes, leased back of surpluses 
property, and budget reform. These tactics took more time to implement than 
minimization tactics. Thus, they were slower in harvesting savings in the current year. 
However, once the tactics were implemented the states recognized significant saving over 
multiple years. 
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2. Quasi-Government Organizations 
a. People  
(1) Financial retrenchment choices: minimize. USPS 
implemented hiring freezes on full-time employees and restructured its workforce. USPS 
created job flexibility by cross-training employees. “Changes in the skill requirements of 
some jobs and the needs of operations have made it more feasible and necessary for 
employees to be trained in different tasks and work in different areas, depending on daily 
needs” (GAO, 2010, p. 29). This gave managers the ability to fill vacancies, left by the 
hiring freeze, with other full-time employees already inside the organization. 
Amtrak did not exhibit any financial retrenchment choices 
designed to minimize the effects of fiscal stress. There was no evidence of hiring freezes, 
furloughs, or workforce restructure. 
USPS’s financial retrenchment choices demonstrate tactics 
designed to minimize the effects and financial burden placed on their workforce. 
Furloughs would have provided an immediate savings; however, USPS favored hiring 
freezes and created greater flexibility over employee assignments by restructuring the 
workforce. 
(2) Financial retrenchment choices: manage. USPS utilized 
force reductions, restructured pay, benefits, and offered early retirements. Through 
personnel cuts, early retirements, and separation incentives designed to encourage 
voluntary attrition, USPS reduced nearly 21 percent of its employees—from 901,238 at 
the end of FY 2000 to 712,082 at the end of FY 2009 (GAO, 2010). The USPS also 
reduced entitlement obligations by hiring part-time employees to fill vacancies not filled 
by its remaining full-time employees. These new part-time hires also had a new two-tier 
pay system. The USPS also proposed a pay-as-you-go approach to funding retiree health 
benefit obligations.  
Amtrak reduced its workforce by cutting management 10 percent. 
Amtrak also reduced passenger support and station staffing. Pay and benefits were also 
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restructured. Pay-as-you-go funding of retiree benefits was implements and labor 
protection arrangements were eliminated. 
The USPS and Amtrak’s financial retrenchment choices indicate a 
strong reliance on management tactics designed to control long-term personnel costs. 
USPS was the only organization to offer early retirement options, but both used force 
reductions and restructured pay and benefits to reduce the organization’s entitlement 
obligations. 
b. Performance 
(1) Financial retrenchment choices: minimize. USPS 
implemented small efficiency improvements tactics to minimize performance costs. To 
reduce delivery costs, USPS increased utilization of cluster boxes and expanded self-
service kiosks.  
Amtrak implemented small efficiency improvements, cut 
departments, burden shared and centralized decision-making. Small efficiency 
improvements include establishment of a reform board to identify improvement 
initiatives;  
aligning dining car staffing with seasonal changes in customer demand; 
establishing metrics to assess service attendants’ onboard sales 
performance; reducing spoilage; closely tracking onboard stock levels; 
regularly refreshing menus; and exploring new pricing and revenue 
management options to align with customer needs and enhance cost 
recovery. (National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 2013, p. 2)  
Amtrak consolidated departments and centralized decision-making 
to better manage losses and identify cost savings. Specifically, Amtrak consolidated 
operations and accountability for its food and beverage into a single department. They 
also appointed a general manager responsible for long-distance services and route 
directors to oversee train profitability (National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 2013).  
In its attempt to reduce maintenance and operations costs through 
burden sharing, Amtrak requested subsidies from states interested in maintaining 
passenger rail service in their cities. 
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While USPS only implemented one of the four performance 
minimization tactics, Amtrak maximized all options to achieve short-term results and 
savings. Organizations experiencing financial retrenchment usually are not the most 
efficient; therefore, performance minimization tactics are least challenging to implement. 
(2) Financial retrenchment choices: manage. USPS requested 
Congressional approval to implement organizational restructuring options such as 
expansion of mail and express services, reduction of delivery from six days a week to 
five days, change in First-Class Mail standards from overnight to two-day delivery, and 
development or enhancements to expand postal products. Additionally, USPS 
implemented low-cost labor alternatives initiatives by decreasing full-time positions in 
favor of part-time and outsourced labor intensive services. 
Amtrak implemented organizational restructuring, large-efficiency 
improvements, low cost labor alternatives, and strategic repositioning tactics. 
Specifically, Amtrak restructured into strategic business units and repealed the ban on 
outsourcing work. Large efficiency improvements include implementation of technology 
and automation, such as point of sale systems, to increase cashless sales onboard trains 
“aimed at improving customer service, automating financial and other reporting, and 
eliminating the error prone and time consuming method of manual data entry” (National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation, 2013, p. 2). Amtrak requested legislative approval for 
strategic repositioning initiatives such as expanding high-speed rail service into new 
geographic locations and cancelling service in unprofitable regions. 
Again, Amtrak maximized all financial retrenchment options under 
performance management, while USPS used two of the four. Low-cost labor alternatives 
and organizational restructuring were used by both. Amtrak clearly preferred efficiency 
initiatives over financial retrenchment choices impacting their employees. 
c. Budget 
(1) Financial retrenchment choices: minimize. USPS deferred 
spending on capital investments and maintenance programs. USPS has historically 
 57 
underfunded maintenance, “causing it to focus on ‘emergency’ repairs at the expense of 
routine maintenance” (GAO, 2010, p. 33). 
“Amtrak took steps to conserve cash by reducing inventory, 
requiring advance payment for work that Amtrak performed for others, and delaying 
payments made to others by 15 days” (General Accounting Office [GAO], 1995, p. 35). 
Additionally, the organization reduced general overhead costs and deferred maintenance 
and capital investments. Amtrak strived to maintain a periodic preventive maintenance 
program and regular heavy overhauls on its locomotives and cars every three to four 
years, but lack of adequate funding led to the implementation of a “progressive 
maintenance program” (GAO, 1995, p. 45). 
USPS and Amtrak’s financial retrenchment choices revealed little 
reliance upon budget minimization tactics. To achieve immediate savings, both 
organizations deferred spending and/or maintenance. Amtrak also used performance 
metrics. 
(2) Financial retrenchment choices: manage. Declines in mail 
volume and increased automation resulted in costly excess capacity. “USPS has reported 
that it has 50 percent excess plant capacity in its First-Class Mail processing operations” 
alone (GAO, 2010, p. 30). As a result, GAO recommended USPS leverage leasing 
partnerships with retailers by establishing postal retail locations “within drug stores, 
grocery stores, and other retail chain stores, such as those in shopping centers and local 
malls” (GAO, 2010, p. 34). The USPS also reduced capital assets by closing selected 
mail processing facilities and streamlining field structure costs. “In fiscal year 2009, it 
closed 1 of its 9 area offices and 6 of its 80 district offices” (GAO, 2010, p. 38). 
In an effort to reduce its operating loss, Amtrak sold real estate, 
other assets, and “right-of-way leases for telecommunications lines and mail and baggage 
service” (GAO, 1995, p. 96). They also refinanced assets. 
Budget management tactics were USPS and Amtrak’s least used 
retrenchment strategy. Of the five general tactics, both sold and/or leased capital assets to 
reduce expenses. 
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3. Publicly Traded Organizations 
a. People 
(1) Financial retrenchment choices: minimize. After hiring a 
new CEO to recover the company, Ford implemented short-term hiring freezes and 
restructured its workweek to stem its personnel costs whiles more drastic longer-term 
solutions could be designed and implemented. 
(2) Financial retrenchment choices: manage. Ford changed its 
leadership and hired Alan Mulally, who was largely credited with a successful turnaround 
at Boeing where he cut the workforce by more than half and shrunk turnaround for 
aircraft builds by 50 percent (Shein, 2012, p. 1). Mulally’s pre-emptive financial and 
strategic choices are credited for Ford successful turnaround. 
In 2002, Ford cut approximately 20,000 jobs and closed numerous 
plants. Four years later, Ford launched a major restructuring plan it called “The Way 
Forward,” which cut an additional 30,000 jobs (Shein, 2012, pp. 4–5). 
Cutting the cost of labor, especially entitlement benefits, was a 
critical piece to Ford’s turnaround. Ford successfully renegotiated salaried benefits with 
the UAW in 2007 and 2009, which garnered approximately $500M in annual savings 
(Sherk, 2008). In addition, Ford struck a deal with the UAW that froze salaries at $28 per 
hour for higher-tier employees and $16 per hour for lower-tier new hires. The labor cost 
cutting measures implemented by Ford resulted in $2 billion in annual savings (George, 
2012). 
Meanwhile, IBM broke a long standing tradition by hiring its first 
outsider as CEO in company history, Louis Gerstner (Applegate et al., 2009, p. 5). For 
IBM, cuts began with small items such as employee perks and jumped to eliminating 
over 40,000 eliminated jobs by early 1993 (Applegate et al., 2009). 
b. Performance 
(1) Financial retrenchment choices: minimize. Ford and IBM 
implemented small efficiency improvements and cut unprofitable programs and 
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departments. Both of these tactics were quick to implement and produced small, but 
immediate savings while management implemented longer-term solutions. 
(2) Financial retrenchment choices: manage. Efforts were 
made to cut vehicle development costs by “engineering a car once to serve multiple 
markets worldwide” (Shein, 2012, p. 2). 
Ford simplified its product line from 20 to eight vehicles. The 
company improved manufacturing productivity by reducing the number of configurations 
for each of its remaining eight models. The redesigned Ford Explorer alone went from 
76,000 configurations to 1,500. Ford also reduced its global suppliers from 3,300 in 2004 
to 1,600 in 2009 by incorporating internationally compatible parts into its vehicle 
manufacturing designs.  
From 2007 to 2011, Ford Motors divested Aston Martin, Volvo, 
Jaguar, Land Rover, and Mercury permitting focused investment to remaining brands 
Ford and Lincoln.  
Ford and IBM revamped their organizational structure by 
eliminating layers of hierarchy and positions deemed to be redundant. Similar to Fords 
One Ford turnaround slogan adopted several years later, One IBM was coined to mark 
the company’s reorganization process. The IBM of 1993 had a complex organizational 
structure with numerous divisions with corresponding executives at the helm. IBM was 
inundated with deep levels of hierarchy, a heavy reliance on an army of corporate staff, 
and a consensus-driven decision-making culture. The divisions were consolidated under 
larger business groups with a streamlined leadership structure which were mandated to 
meet regularly to discuss and address issues as well as corporate strategy. Other cross 
functional teams were established to improve communication, management and 
responsiveness. 
Ford made a strategic decision to break its heavy reliance on the 
gas-guzzling sport utility vehicles and trucks that had been hit hard by the rising fuel 
costs as well as government-mandated fuel economy regulations. A strategic shift was 
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made towards smaller cars that would be considered “best in its class in terms of quality, 
fuel efficiency, safety, smart design, and value” (Shein, 2012, p. 5).  
IBM conducted the most drastic strategic repositioning by shifting 
heavy investment away from mainframe computers into cornering the market as the 
middleman or connector in the developing world of e-commerce based on the then 
fledgling internet. This new market position would establish IBM as a company that 
would serve as a bridge in the Internet age. IBM’s middleware provided the tools and 
technology that served as the interconnections between disparate and distributed data 
sources, applications, and computers (Applegate et al., 2009). Additionally, IBM 
recognized the growing demand for consulting as well as technology services to assist 
clients in their transition into the internet age, including acquisition/integration of 
technology, e-marketing, and e-commerce. Resources were shifted to IBM’s information 
technology service units, IBM Global Services, which grew to provide 38 percent of 
IBM’s revenue by 2000 (Applegate et al., 2009). 
c. Budget 
(1) Financial retrenchment choices: minimize. Ford 
implemented targeted budget cuts on its less profitable divisions. Ford also reduced 
dividend payouts four times and eventually suspended them (Shein, 2012). Ford also 
renegotiated contracts with its remaining suppliers to further reduce the cost of its 
material. 
IBM used performance metrics to assist in budget allocations, and 
greater individual accountability was instituted, especially for managers and division 
vice-presidents. In addition, IBM launched a benchmarking study which compared the 
costs of individual IBM business units in relation to the competition.  
(2) Financial retrenchment choices: manage. In addition to the 
numerous plants closed by Ford, 14 plants worldwide were placed in an idle status over a 
six year period (Shein, 2012). Ford also cut the number of suppliers by more than half 
and continually leveraged their buying power to garner optimal rates. Ford went to great 
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lengths to protect the economies of scale the U.S. automotive industry enjoyed, even 
testifying before Congress in support of its domestic competitors. 
Based on studies and analysis, IBM fixed, closed, or sold business 
units that were either non-essential and/or underperforming. IBM also restructured 
internal transfer costs by opening them up to the free market competition, which forced 
units to either streamline or face outsourcing. In addition, IBM leveraged its considerable 
buying power with select suppliers. 
B. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK — DEVELOPMENT 
1. Establishing the Three-Sector Framework 
The three-sector analytical framework is designed to ultimately compare DoD’s 
financial retrenchment strategies and tactics to those of comparable government, quasi-
government, and publicly traded organizations. In this chapter we compare financial 
choices of the comparable organizations across three sectors. DoD’s choices are 
examined, incorporated, and compared in Chapter V. 
In Table 3, the comparable organizations are grouped by sector atop the 
framework. Their financial choices, based on associated strategy and tactic, are 
represented by an “X” within the matrix. Financial retrenchment tactics, obtained from 
the literature, are first grouped by the strategy: minimize or manage. Then the financial 
choices are grouped by people, performance, and budget according to which group is 
either targeted or most influenced by the tactic. This three-sector framework is not 
intended to be an all-inclusive representation of every financial tactic available to an 



































Hiring Freeze X X X
Furlough X X X
Restructure Workforce/Week X X X X
Small Efficiency Improvements1 X X X X X X
Cut Programs / Departments X X X X X X
Burden Share X X X X X
Centralize Decision Making X X X
Defer Spending / Maintenance X X X X
Performance Metrics X X X
Renegotiate Contracts X X X
Targeted Budget Cuts X X X X X
Change Leadership X X
Force Reductions X X X X X X X
Restructure Pay & Benefits X X X X X X
Early Retirement X X X X
Organizational Restructuring X X X X X X
Large Efficiency Improvements2 X X X
Low Cost Labor Alts3 X X X X
Strategic Repositioning X X X
Sell/Lease Capital Assets X X X X X X X
Budget Restructuring X X X X X
Leverage Buying Power X X X
Across-the-board Cuts
Spending Freeze X X
1 Small efficiency improvements take less than 1 year to implement and realize savings
2 Large efficiency improvements take more than 1 year to implement and realize savings
































Table 3.   Three-Sector Analytical Framework – Comparative Organizations  
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C. COMPARATIVE ORGANIZATIONS — ANALYSIS 
1. Minimization Strategy and Tactics 
a. People 
All three sectors exhibited commonalities in hiring freezes and 
restructuring the workforce. The organizations that used these tactics did so immediately 
upon knowing they would internalize the effects of fiscal stress. This indicates that hiring 
freezes and restructuring the workforce or workweek are easy and quick to implement, 
produce immediate savings and have low impact on the existing workforce, 
organization’s objectives, and long-term wellbeing. In all cases these tactics were 
insufficient at producing enough savings to avert more severe longer-term financial 
choices. At best, during times of acute fiscal stress these retrenchment tactics produced 
short-term budget flexibility. 
Government organizations comprised the only sector to implement 
furloughs with all three states doing so. This would indicate a strong preference to 
maintain the workforce and avoid political implications of layoffs; however, all three 
state governments implemented force reductions. This suggests two findings. First, 
furloughs alone cannot generate the retrenchment savings demanded by acute fiscal 
stress. Second, furloughs were used to compliment force reductions because politicians 
prefer to recognize force reductions through attrition not layoffs. Therefore, especially in 
the case of New Jersey, furloughs, hiring freezes, early retirements, pay and benefit 
restructuring plans proved effective retrenchment tactics that supported force reduction 
by producing attrition, thereby reducing layoffs and minimizing political backlash. 
Therefore, in times of acute fiscal stress, government organizations implement furloughs 
to realize immediate savings, understanding it will produce attrition which ultimately 
supports force reduction goals. 
b. Performance 
Implementing small efficiency improvements and cutting non-essential or 
unprofitable programs and departments had strong three-sector commonalities. These 
tactics can be quickly implemented to achieve immediate savings. Similar to hiring 
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freezes and workforce restructuring, these tactics were low-impact on the organizations 
and ultimately insufficient in producing enough savings to prevent more severe cuts. 
Burden sharing and centralization of decision-making were a two-sector 
commonality between government and quasi-government organizations. Their 
implementation in only two sectors suggests a limiting factor that prevents every 
organization from using them.  
The factor limiting the use of burden sharing was organizational 
autonomy. All three state organizations and Amtrak had the autonomy to directly 
implement burden sharing. By doing this, they were able to produce immediate savings 
with low impact upon their organization’s objectives and long-term wellbeing. Publicly 
traded organizations, however, were unable to burden share the direct effects of their 
organizational retrenchment. The indirect effects of fiscal stress were passed to suppliers 
by way of decreased demand. 
The limiting factor affecting publicly traded organizations’ ability to 
centralize their decision-making was that their processes were already centralized. Both 
publicly traded organizations did, however, cut non-profitable divisions, and restructured 
their organizations along new business lines. However, they saw no need to centralize 
decision-making within new or existing divisions. This indicates that decision-making, 
unlike many government and quasi-government organizations, is already designed to be 
more centralized. 
c. Budget 
All three sectors had one organization that used performance metrics. This 
indicates that all three sectors, when confronted with acute fiscal stress, become risk 
adverse at investing in inventive programs, products or services because of the high 
opportunity cost. 
Deferring spending and maintenance was a two-sector retrenchment tactic 
exhibited by government and quasi-government organizations. These organizations 
preferred to defer costs to recognize current year savings. Government and quasi-
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government organizations did not exhibit long-term concerns with this tactic. They 
instead assumed the maintenance and spending was legitimately not required in the 
current year, or would reasonably be provided for in out years.  
Conversely, publicly traded organizations did not exhibit this financial 
choice because deferring maintenance and spending could adversely affect productivity 
of plants, property, and equipment. Publicly traded organizations preferred to evaluate the 
overall productivity of their divisions and make invest or divest decisions based on 
profitability. 
Targeted budget cuts were evident in every government and publicly 
traded organization. The widespread occurrence of this tactic within these two sectors 
indicates that retrenchment necessitates it to balance a budget or remain profitable. That 
quasi-government organizations did not exhibit the tactics indicates that quasi-
government organizations are over-reliant on government subsidies to cover costs in time 
of acute fiscal stress, or that our research did not uncover targeted cuts. 
Renegotiating contracts was a two-sector retrenchment commonality 
between government and publicly traded organizations. This tactic was implemented by 
only two states and one company. Our research found this tactic provided immediate 
savings realized throughout the life of the contract. The tactic was easily implemented 
and had low impact on the organization and its long-term well-being. However, to 
implement this tactic necessitated an organization have contracts it was able to reduce 
quantity, quality, or performance of services without adverse effects upon the 
organization’s mission. This suggests that the organization’s contracting was needlessly 
incurring additional costs or services in times of relaxed or chronic scarcity. 
2. Management Strategy and Tactics 
a. People 
Force reductions were exhibited by every comparative organization. The 
prevalence of this tactic indicates that workforces will be reduced in times of financial 
retrenchment caused by multi-year acute fiscal stress. This reduction was the result of 
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organizations downsizing unprofitable or non-essential divisions, programs, services, or 
products. 
Every government and quasi-government organization restructured its pay 
and benefits. This suggests that government and quasi-government organizations have 
unsustainable pay and benefit packages that are susceptible to restructuring in time of 
retrenchment. Ford also exhibited this tactic when it restructured UAW pay and benefits 
to remain profitable and avoid bankruptcy. IBM’s pay and benefit packages were 
properly aligned with industry and the company’s objectives. 
Early retirements were offered in all three sectors. This tactic was intended 
to compliment force reductions, which were exhibited by every organization. Early 
retirements facilitated attrition, thereby reducing the amount of layoffs required to meet 
new staffing levels. 
Publicly traded organizations were the only sector to exhibit leadership 
changes that resulted directly from multi-year acute fiscal stress. At Ford and IBM, new 
CEOs were specifically brought in from outside to manage the financial retrenchment 
process and recover the company. Both CEOs had a history of aggressive workforce 
reduction and cost-cutting measures. This indicates that organizations focused on 
aggressively managing revenues, expenditures, and investments to create profitability are 
apt to change leadership when faced with retrenchment. 
b. Performance 
Organizational restructuring was a strong three-sector commonality. This 
indicates that organizations, when faced with retrenchment, reevaluate their structure and 
reorganize either as a result of divesting unprofitable or non-essential divisions, 
programs, or services—or to realize savings through organizational efficiencies. 
Both publicly traded organizations exhibited every long-term performance 
tactic. This indicates that companies or organizations seeking to stem retrenchment and 
create long-term profitability are apt to aggressively implement significant and enduring 
changes to achieve those ends. 
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Conversely, states used the fewest long-term performance. States may 
have implemented long-term performance tactics in years not covered by this project, as 
we discovered by the magnitude of the fiscal stress. Nevertheless, this finding indicates 
that government organizations are slowest to implement tactics that have long-term effect 
upon performance. When Massachusetts and New Jersey attempted to organizationally 
restructure, they met with significant legislative conflict. Government organizations in 
general tried to avoid these tactics, and when they couldn’t they were very guarded at 
their implementation.  
c. Budget 
Every organization sold or leased capital assets. The frequency of this 
tactic indicates it is a preferred retrenchment decision. Selling or leasing surplus property 
provided every organization significant income or savings with little impact on its 
mission. In our project, we found that arriving at the decision to sell or lease assets, 
receiving approval for the plan, and recognizing income or savings from the tactic was a 
long-term process with multi-year results. 
Budget restructuring had a strong two-sector commonality between 
government and publicly traded organizations. Government motivations were twofold:  
Their intent was to bring transparency to government spending or to restrict future 
mismanagement of government finances. Publicly traded companies restructured along 
new business lines and shed non-profitable ones. 
One government organization and both publicly traded organizations 
leveraged their buying power during the time frame examined by this project. It should 
be noted that California and Massachusetts were already members of the Western States 
Contracting Alliance in 2010 and 2009, respectively. Thus, leveraged buying power is 
perceived less as a retrenchment tactic and more as a normal business practice. 
Organizations faced with retrenchment evaluated new opportunities to leverage their 
buying power or maintain the buying power they already enjoyed.  
Spending freezes were implemented by two state governments. 
Government organizations exhibited freezes on baselines and, in two instances, freezes 
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related to delayed approval of budget authority. Quasi-government and publicly traded 
organizations did not implement arbitrary spending freezes, choosing instead to invest in 
profitable operations and divest unprofitable operations. 
Across-the-board cuts were not implemented by any organization. This 
indicates organizational belief that such a cut is a sub-optimal retrenchment choice. 
Organizations instead preferred targeted budget cuts because across-the-board cuts were 
thought to unduly hamper operations. They also prevented budget flexibility by 
preventing organizations from realigning slack resources to sufficiently meet and 
maintain operational objectives.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Chapter IV presented an examination of the financial retrenchment choices made 
by comparative organizations and associated those choices with a strategy and tactic. 
Next, a three-sector analytical framework was developed to categorize the comparative 
organizations’ retrenchment choices. 
Chapter V will examine the type and cause of DoD’s fiscal stress. DoD’s financial 
retrenchment choices are associated with a retrenchment strategy and tactic, and then 
added to the three-sector analytical framework for comparative analysis. The similarities, 




V. DOD’S FINANCIAL RETRENCHMENT CHOICES — A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
“The Defense enterprise is the largest and most complex organization in the 
world. With roughly three million employees, almost 5,000 locations, and a budget of 
more than $600 billion, the Department is bigger than any Fortune 500 company today” 
(DoD SMP, 2013, p. 6). However, DoD is not immune to the effects of economic 
recession. The nation-wide recession, which began in 2008, placed downward pressure 
on federal spending. This resulted in the BCA of 2011, which established discretionary 
spending caps mandating $500 billion in DoD outlay reductions between FY 2013–2022. 
These spending caps were temporarily delayed by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 
2012, but on March 1, 2013, Congress enacted the caps and sequestered $37 billion from 
DoD’s current year budget. Now challenged by financial retrenchment, DoD must make 
difficult choices to balance operational requirements and multi-year commitments within 
new baselines made more uncertain by prospects of further congressional sequester. 
The president’s FY 2014 budget request of $527 billion supports and deepens the 
commitment to a new fiscal strategy (OUSD[C], 2013a). If the DoD continues to 
encounter financial retrenchment at the magnitude currently prescribed in law, readiness 
will deteriorate (DoD, 2013b).  
Multiple reviews and analyses show that additional major cuts—especially 
those on the scale and timeline of sequestration—would require dramatic 
reductions in core military capabilities. Reductions on this scale would 
require the Department to manage risk, readiness, and mission 
requirements in a fundamentally different way than the U.S. military has 
been accustomed to. (DoD, 2013b, p. 10) 
Figure 3 reflects the president’s FY 2014 budget request in comparison to prior 
FY funding and the projected estimates through FY 2018.  
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Figure 3.  President’s FY 2014 Budget Request (from OUSD[C], 2013a) 
To prepare DoD for the challenges ahead, Secretary Hagel tasked the Strategic 
Choices and Management Review Board to research and present financial retrenchment 
options to balance the strategic ends, ways, and means necessary to maintain the NSS and 
QDR objectives. The board “scrutinized every aspect of the DoD’s budget, including: 
contingency planning, business practices, force structure, pay and benefits, acquisition 
practices, and modernization portfolios” (Hagel, 2013a). Furthermore, the FY 2014 
budget reflects a change in “defense-wide investments in all of these areas given the 
realities of a post-9/11 world. It also addresses difficult strategic choices regarding how 
to achieve a force ready for a wider variety of missions in an era of declining resources” 
(OUSD[C], 2013, p. 4-2). 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—DATA EXAMINATION 
1. Type and Cause of Fiscal Stress 
DoD exhibits acute fiscal stress resulting from external factors of problem 
depletion and environmental entropy. Problem depletion arose as the war in Iraq ended in 
2012 and as the war in Afghanistan winds down in 2014. This is coupled with 
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environmental entropy caused by the 2008 economic recession. Since then, the U.S. 
government has faced downward pressure on federal spending as tax revenues decreased 
faster than expenditures and deficits became unsustainable. Congress’ resulting actions 
were to change the nation’s fiscal norm to retrenchment, and its tool was the BCA of 
2011. 
“The BCA of 2011 amended the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
Act of 1985 by reinstating discretionary spending limits for 2012–2021” (OMB, 2013c, 
p. 1). The limits for 2013 and 2014 were further reduced by the ATRA of 2012, when a 
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction failed to propose, and then Congress failed 
to enact, comprehensive and responsible deficit reduction legislation. These spending 
limits are enforced by a sequestration of non-exempt discretionary budget authority that 
is ordered at the end of the current session of Congress if enacted appropriations exceed 
the limits (OMB, 2013c). 
2. Rate and Dration of Fiscal Stress 
DoD is facing multi-year fiscal stress that is producing immediate financial 
retrenchment. The rate and duration of this multi-year fiscal stress, outlined by the BCA 
of 2011, is expected to last until at least 2021. This assumes that unforeseen externalities 
and congressional action don’t alter the rate of discretionary spending outlined in the 
BCA of 2011.  
 The impact of this financial stress was felt immediately. Since the March 1, 2013, 
implementation of discretionary spending caps and sequester, DoD has experienced 
declining budgets that caused significant reductions in military modernization, force 
structure, personnel costs, and overhead expenditures (DoD, 2013a).  
The impact is expected to last years as the DoD faces the continued prospect of 
sequestration in FY 2014 and continued discretionary spending caps out to 2021. The 
department’s 2014 base budget request is $526.6 billion; a $0.9 billion decrease from the 
2013 enacted base budget and a $3.9 billion decrease from the 2012 enacted base budget 
(OMB, 2013b; OUSD[C], 2013b). “When measured in real terms against the growing 
cost of personnel, health care, and weapons, this represents a marked decrease in defense 
 72 
purchasing power compared to the past decade” (DoD, 2013a, p. 1). DoD also stands to 
lose another $52 billion from the 2014 defense budget through sequestration if Congress 
does not appropriate within the discretionary caps, or raise them (DoD, 2013a; OMBc, 
2013). 
The timing of these cuts is especially difficult to internalize since DoD has 
enjoyed extraordinary growth over the last ten years in funding. The department’s budget 
more than doubled between 2001 and 2012 (see Figure 3). Organizational leaders 
accustomed to 10 years of relaxed scarcity must now prepare DoD for a new fiscal reality 
of limited resources as the president and Congress signal a change in fiscal norm to 
retrenchment. 
3. Retrenchment Choices that Support a Minimization Strategy 
An examination of DoD’s financial retrenchment choices reveled the following 
choices designed to support a strategy that to minimize the effects of multi-year acute 
fiscal stress. The choices are discussed and associated to a minimization tactic.  
a. People      
To help achieve the $37 billion spending reduction mandated by 
sequestration, DoD undertook hiring freezes (OUSD[C], 2013a) and furloughs of the 
civil service workforce. On May 14, 2013, Secretary Hagel announced the decision “to 
impose furloughs of up to 11 days on civilian employees to help close the budget gap 
caused by sequestration” (Hagel, 2013b).  
b. Performance 
DoD’s performance minimization tactics included small efficiency 
improvements and program cuts. The FY 2014 budget continues efficiency initiatives  
to reduce the cost of doing business by identifying opportunities for better 
use of resources. The Department continues to identify further reductions 
associated with more effective use of funds, terminating or restructuring 
weapons programs, restructuring or delaying military construction 
programs, and consolidating infrastructure. (OUSD[C], 2013b, p. 6-1) 
These initiatives are estimated to save $31 billion to be applied to deficit reduction. 
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c. Budget 
DoD’s budget minimization tactics included deferred spending and/or 
maintenance, performance metrics, renegotiated contracts, and targeted budget cuts. 
Sequestration has adversely impacted training, maintenance, and investment programs 
(OUSD[C], 2013a). Should sequestration continue “to achieve such rapid savings, the 
Department would first have to target accounts that yield the most immediate savings—
modernization programs, training, and maintenance accounts” (DoD, 2013a, p. 1).  
DoD immediately used performance metrics to guide its contracting 
efforts. In a new era of fiscal austerity, the president’s FY 2014 budget reassessed 
acquisition programs and realigned funding based on the NSS and QDR priorities. 
Programs experiencing significant developmental problems, unsustainable cost growth, 
or are no longer on the Department’s high priority list will be cancelled. “Terminations 
include, Missile Defense Agency Precision Tracking Space System development program 
(FY 2014, $-270 million) and the Air Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System 
developmental effort (FY 2014, $-76 million)” (OUSD[C], 2013b, p. 3-1). Other 
terminated or restructured programs include, but are not all inclusive:  the High Mobility 
Multi-Wheeled Vehicle, Joint Air-to-Ground Missile, Ground Combat Vehicle, Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle, and Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (OUSD[C], 2012). 
Targeted budget cuts in the president’s FY 2014 budget include the 
Missile Defense Agency, Precision Tracking Space System, Expeditionary Combat 
Support System, C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft, and numerous other programs (OUSD[C], 
2013b). Training cycles have also been targeted. “As the demand signal in Afghanistan 
lessens, the Army is adapting their force generation process to better support the broader 
range of capabilities the new defense strategy requires. The new model reduces the active 
component from a 36-month training cycle to a 24-month cycle” (OUSD[C], 2013b,  
p. 4-3).  
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4. Retrenchment Choices that Support a Management Strategy 
An examination of DoD’s financial retrenchment choices reveled the following 
choices are designed to support a strategy to manage the effects of multi-year acute fiscal 
stress. The choices are discussed and associated with a management tactic.  
a. People 
DoD changed leaders, reduced the size of its force, restructured its pay and 
benefits, and offered early retirements to civilian employees. President Obama selected 
Hagel to be secretary of defense, recognizing that his “willingness to defy party loyalty 
and conventional wisdom” (Shane & Sanger, 2013, p. 1) was essential to achieving DoD 
reform after more than a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hagel’s willingness to 
manage DoD’s forthcoming retrenchment is arguably the most significant reason for his 
appointment, highlighted by the unwillingness of his predecessor, Secretary Panetta, to 
do the same. 
The DoD implemented a force reduction plan spanning FY 2013 through 
FY 2017. The Department’s overall military end strength included a 1.4 percent reduction 
in FY 2013, equating to a 31,300 reduction in end strength and a 5.5 percent reduction; 
equating to a 123,900; reduction in end strength by FY 2017 (OUSD[C], 2012).  
DoD’s Strategic Choices and Management Review Board concluded “that 
no serious attempt to achieve significant savings can avoid compensation costs, which 
consume roughly half of the DoD budget” (Hagel, 2013a). Approved reductions (or 
diminished growth) of pay and benefits include lower basic pay raises, basic allowance 
for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and special pays and bonuses. Additionally, 
retiree healthcare changes that will be phased in over several years include increased 
TRICARE Prime enrollment fee, an enrollment fee for TRICARE Standard/Extra, an 
increase to Standard/Extra deductibles, and an increase in co-pays for pharmaceuticals, to 
name a few (OUSD[C], 2012). 
DoD also implemented the Voluntary Early Retirement Authority, a cost-
savings workforce restructuring initiative that helps DoD promote natural attrition by 
incentivizing eligible employees to voluntarily retire or resign. This opportunity is 
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available to both military and civil service employees in order to align DoD’s workforce 
within current budget constraints. 
b. Performance 
DoD is organizationally restructuring, implementing large efficiency 
improvements and strategic repositioning the force. Specifically, organizational 
restructuring included a 20 percent reduction of senior civilian and military positions at 
major staff headquarters; consolidation and elimination of positions within the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense; and elimination of redundant positions, missions, commands, 
technology, intelligence, and facilities throughout the DoD. These efforts were estimated 
to save an estimated $200 billion between FY 2012 and FY 2017 (Hagel, 2013a; DoD, 
2013a). 
To maximize return on investments, DoD sought efficiency improvement 
initiatives within its acquisition programs. DoD restructured the Standard Missile-3 
Block IIB program to focus on common kill vehicle technology for the GBI exo-
atmospheric kill vehicle, and future SM-3 variants. “Consolidating these into one 
technology effort accelerates our ability to address emerging threats and increase the 
protection of the homeland” (OUSD[C], 2013b, p. 3-4).  
Other efficiency improvements focus on personnel-related initiatives. For 
example, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund improves the 
qualifications and experience of its acquisition workforce. Four specific initiatives 
include establish higher standards for key leadership positions, establish stronger 
professional qualification requirements, increase the recognition of excellence in 
acquisition management, and further increases a cost-consciousness workforce 
(OUSD[C], 2013b). 
Finally, the president’s FY 2013 budget called for the strategic 
repositioning of “a smaller and leaner force structure” to be implemented over five years 
from FY 2013 to FY 2017 (OUSD[C], 2012, p. 4-1). Service specific eliminations 
included: a minimum of eight Army Brigade Combat Teams; seven Navy cruisers and 
two Dock Landing Ships; one Marine Corps infantry regiment headquarters, five infantry 
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battalions (four active and one reserve), one artillery battalion, four Tactical Air 
squadrons (three active and one reserve), and one combat logistics battalion; and six Air 
Force combat coded fighter squadrons (one active and five reserve components) and one 
(active) non-combat coded fighter squadron (OUSD[C], 2012, pp. 4-1–4-2). 
c. Budget 
DoD has sold and/or leased capital assets, leveraged its buying power, and 
force implemented across-the-board cuts. During periods of retrenchment, leasing options 
become a more attractive method to acquire “an asset without having to secure 
appropriations for the entire cost of the asset up front. An operating lease spreads the cost 
of the asset over several years, albeit often at a higher cost to the Government” (Lee, 
2003, p. 7). 
DoD’s Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0 initiative leverages buying power 
and promotes greater efficiencies central “to increase productivity in defense spending to 
deliver better value to the taxpayer and Warfighter” (OUSD[C], 2013b, p. 6-7). The BBP 
consists of 36 initiatives, organized into seven overarching categories:  
achieve affordable programs; control costs throughout the product 
lifecycle; incentivize productivity and innovation in industry and 
government; eliminate unproductive processes and bureaucracy; promote 
effective competition; improve tradecraft in acquisition of services; and 
improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce. 
(OUSD[C], 2013b, p. 6-7) 
Finally, DoD force implemented $37 billion in legislatively mandated 
across-the-board cuts, as consequence of the BCA of 2011 sequester. 
B. THREE-SECTOR ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Table 4 incorporates DoD’s financial retrenchment choices within the framework 
we developed in Chapter IV. DoD’s commonalities and differences among government, 





































Hiring Freeze X X X X
Furlough X X X X
Restructure Workforce/Week X X X X
Small Efficiency Improvements1 X X X X X X X
Cut Programs / Departments X X X X X X X
Burden Share X X X X X
Centralize Decision Making X X X
Defer Spending / Maintenance X X X X X
Performance Metrics X X X X
Renegotiate Contracts X X X X
Targeted Budget Cuts X X X X X X
Change Leadership X X X
Force Reductions X X X X X X X X
Restructure Pay & Benefits X X X X X X X
Early Retirement X X X X X
Organizational Restructuring X X X X X X X
Large Efficiency Improvements2 X X X X
Low Cost Labor Alts3 X X X X
Strategic Repositioning X X X X
Sell/Lease Capital Assets X X X X X X X X
Budget Restructuring X X X X X
Leverage Buying Power X X X X
Across-the-board Cuts X
Spending Freeze X X
1 Small efficiency improvements take less than 1 year to implement and realize savings
2 Large efficiency improvements take more than 1 year to implement and realize savings
































Table 4.   Three-Sector Analytical Framework – DoD  
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C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. Minimization Strategy and Tactics 
DoD’s financial retrenchment choices, having been examined and associated with 
a minimization tactic, are incorporated into the three-sector framework. An analysis of 
similarities and differences to government, quasi-government, and publicly traded 
organizations is presented in this section. 
a. People 
DoD’s implementation of hiring freezes and furloughs indicates their 
financial retrenchment choices reflect those of government organizations in times of 
multi-year acute fiscal stress. The analysis of comparative organizations found that 
government organizations implemented hiring freezes and furloughs to realize immediate 
savings with low impact on the organization’s objectives and long-term well-being. 
Because these tactics alone produced insufficient savings, government organizations used 
these tactics in conjunction with force reductions, understanding they would produce 
attrition, thus ultimately supporting force reduction goals while reducing political 
backlash. 
b. Performance 
DoD’s retrenchment choice to pursue small efficiency improvements and 
cut non-essential programs and commands reflected those of all three comparative 
sectors. The analysis of comparative organizations found that in times of multi-year acute 
fiscal stress, all sectors used these tactics because they could be quickly implemented, 
achieved immediate savings, and were low-impact on the organizations. 
DoD’s inability to burden share the direct effects of financial retrenchment 
reflected similarities with the publicly traded sector. DoD and IBM did not pass cuts to a 
subordinate organization. Like publicly traded organizations, suppliers of many of DoD’s 
acquisition programs suffered the indirect effects of lower demand for major force 
acquisitions.  
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DoD, like publicly traded organizations, also did not centralize its 
decision-making processes. DoD did, however, divest non-essential commands and units. 
The decision-making within remaining commands was left unchanged, which also 
reflects the publicly traded sector. This indicates that DoD’s decision-making process is 
already centralized. 
c. Budget 
DoD’s retrenchment choice to use performance metrics in its acquisition 
decisions reflected those of all three comparative sectors. The analysis of comparative 
organizations found that in times of multi-year acute fiscal stress, all sectors became risk 
adverse at investing in inventive programs, products, or services because of the high 
opportunity cost. This also reflects DoD’s decision to cancel innovative procurement 
programs, opting instead for legacy equipment that satisfies the NSS and QDR 
requirements with lower risk of cost overruns. 
DoD’s retrenchment choice to defer spending and maintenance is unique 
from the comparative organizations. Its implementation was the direct byproduct of force 
implemented across-the-board cuts and legislative mandates that inhibited how DoD 
could administer them. DoD did not want to defer maintenance and spending because it 
was viewed as having a direct and immediate effect upon readiness. This reflects the 
publicly traded sector that chose not to defer spending and maintenance in order to avoid 
adverse effects upon productivity. Conversely, government and quasi-government 
organizations did not exhibit long-term concerns with this tactics and thus freely deferred 
spending and maintenance. 
DoD’s financial retrenchment choice to implement targeted budget cuts 
reflects those of government and publicly traded organizations. Like the comparative 
organizations, targeted budget cuts were necessary to balance requirements with available 
funding. Targeted budget cuts allowed DoD leadership to target programs with the lowest 
impact on overall readiness. 
DoD’s financial retrenchment decision to implement the BBP 2.0 initiative 
and renegotiate delivery of other major force program contracts reflects the comparative 
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government and publicly traded sectors. The analysis of comparative organizations found 
that government and publicly traded organizations were apt to renegotiate contracts, but 
those organizations needed to have contracts with excessive or unnecessary quantity, 
quality, or performance requirements. Similarly, DoD renegotiated delivery of major 
force program contracts that had the lowest impact on its operational ability to satisfy the 
NSS and QDR requirements or were excessive to begin with. 
DoD exhibited every financial retrenchment choice designed to produce 
immediate savings to the budget. The only comparative organization to do this was 
Massachusetts. That DoD and Massachusetts exhibited every one of these financial 
retrenchment choices indicates how extensively the organizations were retrenched. It also 
suggests these financial choices are preferred, because they yield immediate savings with 
lower impact than other options to personnel and performance. 
2. Management Strategy and Tactics 
DoD’s financial retrenchment choices, having been examined and associated with 
a management tactic, are incorporated into the three-sector framework. An analysis of 
similarities and differences to government, quasi-government and publicly traded 
organizations is presented in this section. 
a. People 
DoD’s financial retrenchment choice to implement force reductions 
reflected all three sectors of comparative organizations in times of multi-year acute fiscal 
stress. The analysis of comparative organizations found that force reductions were a 
natural consequence of multi-year acute fiscal stress, and the losses often reflected 
downsizing non-essential divisions, programs, services, or products. This reflects DoD’s 
retrenchment decisions, which have and will continue to cut non-essential commands, 
units and programs from the force. 
DoD’s retrenchment decision to restructure pay and benefits reflects that 
of the government sector. The analysis of comparative organizations found that the 
restructuring of pay and benefits was prevalent in the government sector because these 
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government organizations had unsustainable pay and benefit packages that were 
susceptible to restructuring in times of retrenchment. Ford also exhibited this tactic, but 
the other publicly traded company analyzed had a pay and benefit program that was 
aligned with industry and corporate objectives. DoD concedes its pay and benefit 
structure is unsustainable and continues to lobby congress for further modifications. 
DoD’s financial retrenchment choice to implement early retirement 
packages for military and civilian employees reflects that of all three comparative sectors. 
The analysis of comparative organizations found that the tactic was intended to 
compliment force reductions because they facilitated attrition and thus, reduced the 
amount of involuntary separations required to meet new staffing levels. DoD’s Voluntary 
Early Retirement Authority explicitly states that it is a cost savings workforce 
restructuring initiative that promotes natural attrition. 
Finally, DoD’s leadership change reflects the publicly traded sector. The 
analysis of comparative organizations found that organizations, which were focused on 
aggressively managing revenues, expenditures, and investments to create profitability, are 
apt to change leadership when faced with retrenchment. The leadership change to 
Secretary Hagel did just this. It provided the president and DoD with a manager who was 
accepting of retrenchment and focused on aggressively managing expenditures and 
investments within legislatively mandated budget limitations. On July 22, 2013, 
Secretary Hagel announced that the Pentagon “must fundamentally reshape itself to adapt 
for a future of strategic and budgetary challenges” (DoD, 2013c, p. 1). He went on to note 
that DoD must prepare for the future and set clear, strategic priorities within the 
framework of a new fiscal reality and fewer resources (DoD, 2013c). 
b. Performance 
DoD’s retrenchment choice to organizationally restructure reflected those 
of all three comparative sectors. The analysis of comparative organizations found that in 
times of multi-year acute fiscal stress, organizations reevaluated their structure and 
reorganized as a result of divesting non-essential divisions or to realize organizational 
efficiencies. DoD’s organizational restructuring is two-fold. It exhibited budget based 
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organizational restructuring as reflected by the comparative organizations. It also 
exhibited operational restructuring, such as the pacific tilt toward northern Asia. 
DoD’s retrenchment choices to initiate large efficiency improvements and 
strategically reposition the force ultimately supports the earlier finding that a leadership 
change influenced the organization’s retrenchment decisions. The analysis of 
comparative organizations found that in times of multi-year acute fiscal stress, publicly 
traded organizations seeking to stem retrenchment and create long-term profitability were 
apt to aggressively implement significant and enduring changes to achieve those ends. 
Conversely, government organizations were slowest to implement these tactics and tried 
to avoid them, and, when unable to avoid them, were guarded at their implementation. 
DoD is a government organization, lacking autonomy, whose 
retrenchment response largely depends upon its leadership’s standpoint. Therefore, 
DoD’s willingness to aggressively pursue large efficiency improvements and strategically 
reposition supports the finding that Secretary Hagel, like the public sector CEO’s, is 
focused on aggressively managing revenues, expenditures, and investments to create 
operational readiness within legislatively mandated budget limitations. It is reasonable to 
assume that DoD, under different leadership, may have been slower to implement these 
tactics, tried to avoid them altogether, and when forced into action, been guarded in their 
implementation. 
c. Budget 
DoD’s financial retrenchment choice to sell capital assets reflected those 
of every comparative organization. The analysis of comparative organizations found that 
selling or leasing surplus was a preferred choice and provided significant income or 
savings with little impact on organizational performance. 
DoD’s decision to leverage its buying power reflected every comparative 
organization but can be considered a normal business practice often revisited during time 
of financial retrenchments. The analysis of comparative organizations found that one 
government and both publicly traded organizations exhibited this tactic, but all 
organizations faced with retrenchment evaluated new opportunities to leverage or 
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maintain their buying power. DoD, like the comparative organizations exhibited this 
tactic in times of relaxed scarcity and revisited it during acute scarcity, thus indicating 
DoD was reevaluating the potential to recognize additional low-impact long-term 
savings. 
DoD was the only organization that managed across-the-board cuts. The 
retrenchment choice to apply across-the-board cuts was legislatively forced upon DoD. 
Across-the-board cuts, known as sequestration, was a political tool that produced 
immediate short-term savings at the detriment of programs and operations unable to 
absorb such cuts. The fact that no other organization selected across-the-board cuts as a 
financial retrenchment choice indicates across-the-board cuts are a sub-optimal 
retrenchment choice.  
Most organizations, DoD included, believe equitable cuts unduly hamper 
operations. Senior leaders are prevented the budget flexibility they desire because it 
prevents them from realigning slack resources across the organization to sufficiently meet 
and maintain operational objectives. 
This finding also provides a sense of severity about the fiscal stress facing 
our federal government. The fiscal stress upon our nation must demand a response if 
Congress were to design and agree to this retrenchment tool. That Congress ultimately 
enacted a sub-optimal retrenchment tool may highlight the inability of our lawmakers to 
reach consensus on federal priorities that are subsequent to controlling the deficit. 
D. CONCLUSION 
DoD is in the midst of an acute multi-year fiscal stress and is devising financial 
retrenchment strategies and tactics to close the fiscal deficit. The prolonged nature of the 
fiscal stress coupled with the profound cuts outlined in the BCA of 2011 force DoD to 
make tough financial retrenchment decisions to achieve fiscal solvency. DoD’s current 
strategies and tactics were compared to other government, quasi-government, and 
publicly traded industries to determine where commonalities and difference exist. 
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The analysis found that DoD’s financial retrenchment choices are characteristic of 
comparative organizations, with the exception of across-the board cuts. DoD’s financial 
retrenchment choices toward its workforce reflects traditional choices of government 
organizations faced with multi-year acute fiscal stress. In addition, DoD’s financial 
retrenchment choices affecting organizational performance reflect those of the publicly 
traded sector. However, their implementation depends largely upon organizational 
leadership and the influence of DoD’s lack of autonomy and inability to burden share. 
Finally, DoD’s financial retrenchment choices affecting the budget are similar to those of 
comparative organizations with one critical exception—across-the-board cuts. DoD’s 
implementation of across-the-board cuts was legislatively mandated and undesired. 
Resultantly, across-the-board cuts influenced more sever cost cutting tactics. 
Chapter VI provides a summary of our findings, recommendations for future 
research, and conclusions based on information collected and analyzed in Chapters I–V.  
 85 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
This project compared DoD’s financial retrenchment choices to those of 
comparable government, quasi-government, and publicly traded organizations. Based on 
these comparisons, we identified sectoral similarities and differences to determine 
whether DoD’s financial retrenchment choices are characteristic of an organization under 
similar fiscal stress, or unique to the DoD. 
B. FINDINGS 
DoD’s work force retrenchment choices reflected those of the government sector. 
Financial retrenchment caused by multi-year acute fiscal stress necessitated work force 
reductions by every organization. Government organizations used hiring freezes, 
furloughs, and early retirement packages to create immediate savings and produce 
attrition, thus supporting force reduction goals and reducing political backlash. 
DoD’s retrenchment choices affecting organizational performance depend largely 
upon organizational leadership and, to a lesser extent, DoD’s lack of autonomy and 
inability to burden share. Leaders of organizations that were limited in autonomy were 
quicker to implement minimization and management strategies. Conversely, government 
organizations with full autonomy were slower to implement long-term performance 
initiatives as part of their management strategy. Fully autonomous government 
organizations tried to avoid long-term performance initiatives and, when forced into 
action, were guarded in their implementation. 
The DoD has been quicker to accept the new fiscal norm and implement 
minimization and management strategies, which most closely reflect the behavior of 
publicly traded organizations. Secretary Hagel, within five months of taking office, stated 
financial retrenchment is the new fiscal norm and that long-term retrenchment choices 
must be devised and implemented (DoD, 2013c). 
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The two publicly traded organizations examined in this project aggressively 
managed expenditures and investment within budget limitations to achieve organizational 
objectives. These characteristics were also evident within DoD, as Secretary Hagel 
announced the DoD “must fundamentally reshape itself to adapt for a future of strategic 
and budgetary challenges” (DoD, 2013c, p. 1). Then on March 18, 2013, just one month 
after taking office and two weeks after the 2013 sequester, Secretary Hagel formed the 
Strategic Choices and Management Review board, tasking it to examine the choices 
underlying the department’s strategy, force posture, investments, and institutional 
management. “This Strategic Choices and Management Review will define the major 
decisions that must be made in the decade ahead to preserve and adapt our defense 
strategy, our force and our institutions under a range of future budgetary scenarios” 
(Garamone, 2013, p. 1). 
 This finding highlighted the significance of implementing leadership change 
during times of financial retrenchment and suggests that DoD’s retrenchment choices 
were previously insufficient to achieve the necessary savings mandated under the new 
fiscal norm. It also suggests previous leadership were not as aggressive as they should 
have been, which as discussed in the literature review, is a common behavior that people 
resist change and attempt to avoid or delay internalizing the effects of retrenchment. 
DoD’s retrenchment choices affecting the budget exhibit one critical exception; it 
was the only organization to manage across-the-board cuts. An across-the-board cut, 
known as sequestration, was a political tool that produced immediate short-term savings 
at the detriment of programs and operations unable to absorb such cuts. No other 
organization examined selected this retrenchment tactic, thus indicating it is a sub-
optimal financial retrenchment choice. It is noted that DoD’s implementation of across-
the-board cuts was legislatively mandated and undesired. 
This finding also provided a sense of severity about the multi-year acute fiscal 
stress confronting the federal government. Congress’ decision to create and ultimately 
enact a sub-optimal financial retrenchment tool highlights their consensus that the deficit 
is unsustainable and their discord regarding how to manage it.  
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Across-the-board cuts prevented DoD from realigning slack resources across the 
organization to sufficiently meet and maintain operational objectives. Thus,  more severe 
cost cutting tactics  were implemented. Specifically, DoD chose to defer maintenance and 
spending on current year operations. DoD’s organizational preferences regarding the 
deferral of spending and maintenance otherwise reflected those of publicly traded 
organizations, which did not defer maintenance and spending because it was harmful to 
productivity. 
This project also found that DoD, like the comparative organizations, became risk 
adverse in their procurement and investment decisions, preferring proven programs, 
products, or services because of the high opportunity cost of delays and failure. Financial 
retrenchment due to multi-year acute fiscal stress also necessitated, in every government 
and publicly traded organization, targeted budget cuts to balance revenues and 
expenditures. DoD and every comparative organization also sold or leased back surplus 
properly to realize low-impact income or savings. Thus these tactics are characteristic of 
multiple sectors and are attributed to the type and cause of fiscal stress.  
Findings also included insight into how organizations select retrenchment 
strategies. Multi-year acute fiscal stress caused by external factors necessitated a cohesive 
multi-strategy approach to achieve fiscal solvency and lasting results. Every government 
and quasi-government organization was simultaneously implementing resist, delay, 
minimize, and management strategies and tactics. Furthermore, findings show that multi-
year acute fiscal stress ultimately exhausted low-impact cuts and efficiency savings, 
which required organizations to make substantial cuts to workforces, programs, and 
services. 
The extent to which strategies and tactics were favored depended on 
organizational autonomy and its ability to burden share. Organizations with full 
autonomy preferred resist and delay tactics. All three state governments raised revenue, 
provided rosy or optimistic economic scenarios, burden shared, and exhibited budgetary 
gamesmanship. Organizations limited in autonomy exhibited far less resist and delay 
strategies and tactics. These organizations, like DoD, would try, with limited success to 
obtain additional funding, modify restrictive directives, or delay consequences of 
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retrenchment. The result is that organizations limited in autonomy and restricted in their 
ability to burden share adopt minimization and management strategies more rapidly. 
Publicly traded companies exhibited the fewest resist and delay strategies. 
Companies needed to quickly adapt to economic situations to achieve profitability. 
Leadership changes, exhibited by both Ford and IBM, were the critical tactics that shifted 
publicly traded companies from resist and delay strategies to aggressive minimization 
and management retrenchment strategies. A change in leadership was especially evident 
when the cause of acute fiscal stress was external and required an immediate response to 
achieve a successful turnaround.  
Finally, this project revealed that government and quasi-government 
organizations have unsustainable pay and benefit packages that are susceptible to 
restructuring in times of retrenchment. Multi-year acute fiscal stress necessitated every 
government organization significantly change their pay and benefit packages. DoD has 
already reduced the rate of growth of military pay raises to one percent, which is beneath 
the government’s average rate of inflation. DoD also stopped multiple special and combat 
pays, reduced basic allowances for housing, and proposed an increase to working-age 
retirees’ medical premiums. Findings indicate that financial retrenchment caused by 
multi-year acute fiscal stress will necessitate that DoD must further deepen cuts to 
military pay and benefits to achieve solvency. 
Based on our findings, we determined the DoD’s financial retrenchment choices, 
during times of multi-year acute fiscal stress, are characteristic of comparative 
organizations with the exception of across-the-board cuts. Furthermore, multi-year acute 
fiscal stress exhausted low-impact cuts and efficiency savings, which ultimately 
demanded substantial cuts with long-term operational consequences. Therefore, 
implementing leadership change and long-term strategic plans were significant 
characteristics of effective retrenchment management within organizations lacking 
autonomy. New leaders were quicker to implement aggressive retrenchment strategies 
and strategic plans thereby minimizing sub-optimal cuts and promoting long-term 
organizational recovery. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
The topic of financial retrenchment within the DoD is timely and relevant. This 
project endeavored to examine the financial retrenchment choices of the DoD. Based on 
our three-sector framework, we identified sectoral similarities and differences to 
determine whether DoD’s financial retrenchment choices were characteristic of an 
organization under similar fiscal stress, or unique to the DoD. 
Further research opportunities in the area of defense financial retrenchment 
include: 
• An analytical comparison of organizational retrenchment strategies and 
tactics to consequences to determine whether a correlation exists among 
choices and effects. 
• An analysis of where organizations invest during times of multi-year acute 
fiscal stress. 
• A comparison of the financial retrenchment choices of other federal 
government departments or agencies to the DoD. 
• A comparison of post-war financial retrenchment choices of foreign 
nations to the DoD.  
• A historical comparison of the post-war financial retrenchment choices of 
the DoD. 
• Implications of across-the-board cuts upon the DoD’s financial 
retrenchment choices, specifically related to operational readiness and/or 
maintenance. 
• Identify and define a comprehensive list of financial retrenchment tactics. 
Discuss their application and associate them with a retrenchment strategy. 
• Examine what strategies and tactics are most appropriate to combat 
various types of fiscal stress. 
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• An evaluation of the extent and impact autonomy influences retrenchment 
decisions in a fiscally constrained environment. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Our research found that multi-year acute fiscal stress caused by external factors 
necessitated a cohesive multi-strategy approach to achieve fiscal solvency and lasting 
results. Organizations with less autonomy had to implement minimize and manage 
strategies and tactics sooner and to greater extent. The DoD’s financial retrenchment 
choices were further hampered by legislative mandates that required across-the-board 
cuts and shielded various line items, such as military pay and benefits. 
 Our finding that DoD’s financial retrenchment choices are characteristic of 
comparative organizations, except for across-the-board cuts, does not account for the 
utility of the retrenchment choices themselves. However, it was evident that every 
organization faced with financial retrenchment exhibited a preference for tactics that had 
the lowest impact upon the organization. Further, organizations such as DoD that are 
limited in autonomy and unable to burden share, must substantially retrench when 
confronted with multi-year acute fiscal stress caused by external factors. As such, 
organizations eventually run out of low-impact cuts or efficiencies to bridge the financial 
gap. The result is that real cuts to the organization and its operations must occur at a 
much deeper and quicker rate than those of an organization with autonomy and the ability 
to burden share. 
Successful organizations develop a plan early and use it to guide its retrenchment 
choices that create budget flexibility to enable investment along new lines of operations. 
The result is an organization that weathers the multi-year acute fiscal stress and emerges 
well positioned to meet its operational requirements well into the future. Without a plan 
the organization runs the risk of allowing its fiscal condition to dictate how and where 
cuts must be made potentially resulting in sub-optimal decisions and unduly restricting 
the organizations ability to operate.  
We recommend the DoD create a fiscal strategic plan for its enterprise to 
promulgate and guide its financial retrenchment choices. This plan should adequately 
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provide a force structure and alignment able to combat prospective national security 
threats within a new fiscal reality defined by fewer resources. The plan’s financial 
requirements should be negotiated with Congress and used to guide the DoD’s financial 
retrenchment decisions and minimize sub-optimal cuts that unnecessarily hamper the 
military’s long-term restructuring. Some steps have already been taken toward these 
ends, but more must be done. Secretary Hagel has signaled the DoD must prepare to 
deepen cuts and has appointed the Strategic Management Review Board to develop 
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